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NOTES
TOWARD A NEW STANDARD IN GENDER
DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF VIRGINIA MILITARY
INSTITUTE*
The whole drift of our law is toward the absolute prohibition
of all ideas that diverge in the slightest form from the accepted
platitudes, and behind that drift of law there is a far more
potent force of growing custom, and under that custom there
is a national philosophy which erects conformity into the no-
blest of virtues and the free functioning of personality into a
capital crime against society.'
Through many battles in the courts, legislatures, and businesses
of America, women have made unprecedented progress in secur-
ing equal rights under the law in the past thirty years. Society
and the courts, however, have failed to reach the same consensus
regarding the place of gender under our Constitution as they
have with respect to race.
The conflict between women's demands for economic and pro-
fessional equality and men's basic desire for privacy poses delicate
questions that current Equal Protection Clause analysis cannot
clearly answer. Twelve years after Melissa Ludtke won the right
to conduct interviews with professional male athletes in their
locker rooms,2 National Football League Commissioner Paul Tag-
liabue fined Sam Wyche, coach of the Cincinnati Bengals, $30,000
* The author would like to thank many individuals for their patience and help in
preparing this Note; in particular, Susan D. Parker, M. Ed., for her comments and
research assistance in the field of education and William Cronenberg, 1st Lt. U.S.A.R.,
for his insights into life at VMI.
1. In Br -ef, the Law, N.Y. TiES, Aug. 9, 1964, S 6 (Magazine), at 60 (compilation of
quotations by Ruth Block; quotations attributed to H.L. Mencken).
2. See Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court reasoned that because
the City of New York leased the stadium to the New York Yankees baseball team, the
Commissioner of Baseball's policy of excluding female reporters from the locker room
constituted state action. Id. at 98. The court determined that the policy of exclusion was
not substantially related to the privacy of the players and that it interfered with Ms.
Ludtke's "fundamental right to pursue her profession in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:' Id.
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for refusing to allow a female sports reporter into a locker room
to conduct postgame interviews.3 Coach Wyche implied that con-
cerns for the privacy of his players motivated his actions when
he stated, "I will not allow women to walk in on 50 naked men. '4
Other professional athletes have expressed similar concerns. 5
In New York State Club Association v. City of New York, 6 the
New York Court of Appeals ruled that state laws banning all-
male clubs that provided benefits to persons other than their own
members did not violate constitutional rights to freedom of as-
sociation and privacy. 7 As in the cases involving female reporters,
the men in New York State Club believed they had a right to
congregate in the absence of women.8 Because these congregations
resulted in economic benefits to the club members, women exerted
political pressure to prohibit such clubs.9
Although these conflicts occurred in different legal climates,
they highlight a fundamental problem with Equal Protection
Clause analysis in gender discrimination cases. Normatively,
individuals should not receive different legal treatment merely
because they were born one sex and not the other, however
real physiological 0 and psychological" differences exist be-
3. Ann Blackman & Wendy Cole, Trouble in the Locker Rooms; More Women Reporters
Face Hostility that Threatens Their Access, TIME, Oct. 15, 1990, at 97.
4. Id.
5. See id. When Detroit Free Press reporter Jennifer Frey asked Jack Morris, a pitcher
for the Detroit Tigers, for an interview, he reportedly responded by saying "I don't talk
to women when I am naked unless they are on top of me or I am on top of them." Id-
6. 505 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987).
7. Id. at 916, 921-22.
8. See id. at 920.
9. See id. at 916-17.
10. See JUDITH STIEHM, BRING ME MEN AND WOMEN: MANDATED CHANGE AT THE U.S.
AIR FORCE ACADEMY 173 (1981). These differences are not limited to the relative roles in
child bearing. For example, on average, women have 24% body fat as compared to 16%
for males, and "[m]inimum essential fat is considered to be 3 percent for men and 14
percent for women." Id. Additionally, men tend to have greater upper body strength. Id.
11. One journalist summerized these differences as such:
Relationship colors every aspect of a woman's life, according to the research-
ers. Women use conversation to expand and understand relationships; men
use talk to convey solutions, thereby ending conversation. Women tend to
see people as mutually dependent; men view them as self-reliant. Women
emphasize caring; men value freedom. Women consider actions within a
context, linking one to the next; men tend to regard events as isolated and
discrete.
Anastasia Toufexis, Coming from a Different Place: Men and Women Just Don't See Things
The Same Way. Some Surprising New Studies of Schoolgirls Show Why, TIME SPECIAL
ISSUE, WOMEN: THE ROAD AHEAD, Fall 1990, at 65; see also DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST
DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990) (explaining how fundamental
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tween gender groups.12 These differences are probably "the
most salient of all personal characteristics. Observers almost
always notice and recall the gender of a target person."' 3
Common experience indicates that men and women interact
differently. Although using group differences to treat indivi-
duals differently may result in overbroad exclusions from cer-
tain benefits, the very existence of the differences impedes
consistent application of a single Equal Protection standard of
review.
The Court currently applies mid-tier or intermediate level
scrutiny in gender discrimination cases. The United States Su-
preme Court first announced this standard in Craig v. BorenW4 .
when it stated that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, pre-
vious cases establish that classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives."' 5 Justice Rehnquist
immediately criticized the standard in his dissent:
How is this Court to divine what objectives are important?
How is it to determine whether a particular law is "substan-
tially" related to the achievement of such objective, rather
than related in some other way to its achievement? Both of
the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite
differences in perception create substantial obstacles to communication between males
and females); Judith Galloway, The Impact of the Admission of Women to the Service
Academies on the Role of the Woman Line Officer, 19 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 647 (1976).
Other researchers have suggested that
the difference in emotional response in men and women can be explained by
the differences in the structure and organization of the brain. Because the
two halves of a man's brain are connected by a smaller number of fibers
than a woman's, the flow of information between one side of the brain and
the other is more restricted.
Ann Moir & David Jessel, Sex and the Cerebellum: Thinking About the Real Difference
Between Men and Women, WASH. POST, May 4, 1991, at K4.
12. The issue of whether these differences result from nature or nurture is beyond
the scope of this Note. It may be within the scope of constitutional inquiry when
differences in treatment create self-perpetuating stereotypes. See Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (holding that the "policy of excluding males
for admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of
nursing as an exclusively woman's job"). Some evidence indicates that differences in
physical strength between men and women are partially attributable to stereotypes. See
STIEHM, supra note 10, at 168.
13. Jerome Adams, Women at West Point: A Three Year Perspective, 11 SEX ROLES 525,
533-34 (1984) (citing Kay Deaux, Sex: A Perspective on the Attribution Process, in 1 NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ATTRBUTION RESEARCH 335, 535-52 (John H. Harvey et al. eds., 1976)).
14. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
15. Id. at 197.
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subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to par-
ticular types of legislation, masquerading as judgments
whether such legislation is directed at "important" objectives
or, whether the relationship to those objectives is "substan-
tial" enough. 16
Justice Souter echoed these concerns during his confirmation
hearings when he stated: "[The mid-tier test] is not good, sound
protection. It is too loose."1 7
One of the most recent gender discrimination cases litigated
on Equal Protection grounds was a dispute between the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI), located in Lexington, Virginia, and the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ).18 The district court
rejected DOJ's allegation that VMI's policy of limiting admissions
to its four-year cadet program to men violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 The integration issue received wide attention and
evoked strong emotional responses from alumni and other indi-
viduals. 20 Many students claimed the educational system at VMI
could not remain the same if women were admitted.2 1
16. Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
17. Ruth Marcus & Michael I. Sikoff, Souter Declines Comment on Abortion; Nominee
Moves to Dispel Image as Judge Lacking Companion, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1990, at Al,
A16.
18. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), appeal docketed, No.
90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991).
19: Id. at 1415. The government did not litigate on statutory grounds because Title IX
of the Civil Rights Act specifically exempts traditionally single-sex schools and military
or maritime academies from its prohibitions of sexual discrimination in admission deci-
sions. Id. at 1408; see 20 U.S.C. S 1681(a)(4-(5) (1988).
20. See, e.g., Judy Mann, Neanderthal Bonding, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1990, at B3
(asserting that "VMI's argument for keeping its male-only policy is the same kind of
bunk that every other institution has used to keep women out-and down-and deserves
the same rapt attention we would give to the caterwauling of Virginia's last mountain
lion."); Willis C. Rowe, Why Women Should Be Kept out of VMI, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13,
1990, at F2 ("With nothing to lose, the VMI students can afford a farewell march-past
with Rebel colors flying, a ceremonial stacking of arms and abandonment of the campus
to the silly women. . . . The question is whether anyone has the brains and self-respect
to do this.").
21. See Mitchell Locin, Breaking Ranks: Virginia Military Institute Fears Women Would
Tarnish its Mettle, CH. Tam., Feb. 26, 1990, Tempo section, at 1. One student stated,
"'There's no way it could be the same,' . . . if women are allowed to join the Corps of
Cadets." Id. Another asserted:
Everybody is here living as one, getting along every day with each other,
no shades on the windows. If she comes, there's going to be shades and
locks put on the doors. She might not even be in the barracks. I think that
will break the unification. Then I think there will be problems with our
strong honor code.
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With a rich history, VMI is a small,s public,2 all-male,m
military college composed of a corps of cadets 6 As such, the
educational program pervades every aspect of a cadet's life.2
Both the educational program and admissions process place heavy
emphasis on physical conditioning.2 Life at VMI is characterized
22. VMI was founded on November 11, 1839. VmGNIA MILITARY INSTITUTE 1990-91
CATALOGUE 7 [hereinafter CATALOGUE]. Twenty years later the Corps of Cadets sent a
contingent to Harper's Ferry to maintain order at the execution of John Brown. Id. at
9. In 1864, the Corps marched to battle at New Market, Virginia, and "won credit for
helping turn the tide in favor of the Confederate forces" at the cost of "10 cadets killed
and 47 wounded." Id. Federal forces later burned the Institute, but VMI literally rose
from the ashes of war in 1865. Id. Distinguished alumni include George C. Marshall,
United States Army Chief of Staff during World War H and winner of the 1953 Nobel
Peace Prize; Thomas Troy Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army during World War
11; General George Patton, who matriculated at VMI and later transferred to West Point;
and Lt. Gen. James Henry Binford Peay III, commanding general of the 101st Airborne
during operation Desert Storm. Telephone interview with Jeff Jackson, Curator of the
VMI Museum (Nov. 15, 1991).
VMI and The Citadel, a public all-male military institute in South Carolina, continue
to add color to the nation's history. On February 24, 1991, Operation Desert Storm began
a blitzkrieg-style attack to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. R.W. Apple, Jr., War
in the Gulf. The Overview, N.Y. TeEs, Feb. 24, 1991, at Al. Part of the liberation efforts
included the largest helicopter assault in history, reinforced by a 700 truck convoy. Id.
A Citadel graduate led the convoy, and a VMI alumnus led the entire assault. Id. The
code name of the convoy was "Citadel," and the code name of the road it used was
"Newmarket" in remembrance of VMI's participation in that Civil War battle. Id. Ironi-
cally, female helicopter pilots participated in the assault. See id.
23. Total enrollment in the 1988-89 academic year included 1436 cadets and 117 summer
students. ExEcUTIVE BUDGET OF THE COMMONWEALTH 1990-92, at F-87. The legality of the
summer program and night classes to which women are admitted is not at issue in the
suit. See infra note 25.
24. VA. CODE ANN. S 23-14 (Michie 1985). VMI receives substantial aid from the
Commonwealth. Appropriations for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1990 and June 30,
1991, were $10,608,916 and $10,560,455, respectively, from the General Fund. 1990 Va.
Acts 2009. vMrs total budget for these two years was $26,371,423 and $26,602,172,
respectively. Id.
25. Women may enroll as day students during the summer session, but they must
arrange to live off campus. CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 60. Women may also enroll in
evening classes that cadets are not permitted to attend. Id.
26. "All students at VMI are members of the Corps of Cadets." Id. at 7. "ITihe Institute
offers young men a challenging academic program conducted within the framework of
military life and discipline." Id at 12.
27. One indicator of the importance of full participation in the cadet program is that
"[m]arriage constitutes a disqualification for admission to the Institute as a cadet, and
marriage during the period of cadetship requires that the cadet resign." Id. at 20. At
the national service academies, marriage during or before cadetship is also a disqualifi-
cation. Interview with Brg. Gen. John Bard (United States Army, Ret.), Former Com-
mandant of Cadets, United States Military Academy, from Jan. 1977 through July 1979,
in Williamsburg, Va. (Oct. 8, 1991).
28. All cadets are required to take eight consecutive semesters of physical education,
including swimming, boxing, and wrestling. CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 127. Each class
has a physical fitness component measured by a physical fitness test constituting one
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by complete equality within each class,29 providing cadets with
little, if any, privacy.30
Because the VMI educational program removes all privacy from
cadets' lives, the different social dynamics between women and
men must dominate much of the factual analysis concerning the
integration issue. The case is thus an ideal vehicle to examine
the weaknesses of current Equal Protection doctrine and reme-
dies in gender discrimination cases. Any judicial order to inte-
grate VMI would involve a continuing oversight responsibility.
Whether a sufficient number of women would attend the school
if it failed to make allowances accommodating privacy values is
doubtful. Such allowances would necessitate a change in educa-
tional practices that VMI has used successfully for over 150
years.
quarter of the final grade for that course. See id. The emphasis on physical fitness is
also an element of the admissions decision:
To qualify for enrollment at VMI, an applicant must be in sound health,
good physical condition, and must be able to participate fully in the Institute's
strenuous physical programs. VMrs physical and medical standards are
essentially those required for enrollment in ROTC ....
Because each cadet lives in a demanding military environment, mental and
physical disabilities that would limit his chances for success are examined
carefully.
Id. at 29. The catalogue also contains a list of disqualifying defects. See id. (listing defects
such as obesity, respiratory problems, cardiovascular or renal disorders, "impairments of
the senses or bodily functions," nervous disorders, and muscular or skeletal defects).
29. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1439 (WJ). Va. 1991), appeal
docketed, No. 90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991). "The VMI experience is based on absolute
equality, which is achieved through treating everyone in exactly the same way." Id.
30. The court found that "the most important aspects of the VMI educational experience
occur in the barracks." Id. at 1423. "In barracks, a cadet is totally removed from his
social background." Id. at 1424. As the court stated:
There is a total lack of privacy [within the barracks]. Everyone knows what
everyone else is doing. The closest a cadet can come to privacy at VMI is a
study table in the library because there is literally no place in the barracks
that physically affords privacy. The open windows on the doors in the
barracks are significant because they enable the officer in charge to walk
around and check in each room at night and see every cadet without anything
being hidden ...
... There are no locks on the doors of cadet rooms in barracks .... no
window shades or curtains. Barracks rooms open onto stoops. The stoops
are open corridors at each level and provide access to the gang bathrooms.
On the fourth floor a cadet cannot go to the bathroom or go to take a shower
without being observed by everyone in that quadrangle on all levels. This
places cadets under constant scrutiny and permits minute regulation of
behavior, especially for the fourth classmen [freshmen] who reside on the
top floor.
GENDER DISCRIMINATION
This Note analyzes the VMI controversy in the context of
current Equal Protection and Due Process jurisprudence. The
first part discusses the specifics of education at VMI, the case
history to date, and the Virginia system of higher education. The
next two parts discuss the development of gender Equal Protec-
tion Clause analysis and the viability of a procedural due process
focus in analyzing gender discrimination. The fourth part applies
the current standards of review to VMI and shows, independently
of the analysis of the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Virginia, how VMI's facially discriminatory admis-
sions policy is constitutional.
In its final part, this Note proposes that the Supreme Court
adopt a new standard of review to examine gender discrimination
cases under the Equal Protection Clause. The new standard would
make a distinction between laws establishing procedural burdens
on members of one gender and not the other. When no a priori
procedures exist to gain eligibility to a benefit, the courts should
utilize strict scrutiny review. When the government imposes a
procedural burden, the court should inquire into the nature of the
right. Because sex is usually used as a proxy for some other trait,
a procedure allocating a right or benefit between individuals or
the state-as-a-state' should be able to take the trait into account
without resorting to a presumption based on gender. This Note
refers to such rights as "individual rights," because the person
against whom the plaintiff is attempting to assert certain rights is
an individual or the state-as-a-state. In cases involving an individual
right, the procedural barrier should be per se unconstitutional
because it is unnecessary. When the exercise of the right would
impose burdens on members of the opposite gender in a group,
however, the courts should utilize a balancing test. Because a
decision favoring the group may impose burdens on the individual
seeking the right, the individual should receive damages. This Note
refers to such asserted rights as "group rights," because the
plaintiff is attempting to assert rights against a group.
THE HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA32
VMI's Educational System
VMI is one of only four single-sex public colleges remaining in
the country, 3 and although the number of single-sex private
31. See infra note 340 for a further discussion of the concept of a state-as-a-state.
32. 766 F. Supp. 1407.
33. The only two all-female public colleges in the country are Texas Women's University
1992]
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colleges is declining rapidly,3 4 VMI has decided to fight integra-
tion to the end. Attempts to integrate VMI through the legislative
process in 1990 failed when the Chairman of the Virginia Senate's
Education and Health Committee ruled out of order a bill re-
quiring integration.35 A similar defeat occurred in the 1991 leg-
islative session, and any future attempts at integrating VMI
through the legislative process will probably fail because "VMI
alumni populate the ranks of the state's business and political
elite, and many graduates are deeply opposed to allowing women
to enroll."36 VMI alumni have expressed their opposition by
raising over $100,000 to oppose the DOJ suit.37
VMI claims that the "rat line" generates this alumni loyalty.e
According to VMI's catalogue: "The [rat] system is equal and
33: The only two all-female public colleges in the country are Texas Women's University
in Denton, Texas, see Colin Hughes, Educati: Better Dead than Co-ed, THE INDEPENDENT,
June 7, 1990, at 13, and Douglass College in New Brunswick, New Jersey, see Virginia,
766 F. Supp. at 1420. The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, is the only other all-
male, public college. See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1420. It too is a military school. Id.
34. See Hughes, supra note 33, at 13 (commenting that "[a]ll-women's colleges in the
United States have been shutting down or converting to co-education at a consistent and
rapid rate: from nearly 298 in 1960 to 94 today").
Examples of single-sex schools that have taken action to admit members of the opposite
sex include Mills College in Oakland, California (which has postponed its decision for one
year as a result of student protests), see id.; Washington and Lee University in Lexington,
Virginia, see Jay Walsh, When Tradition Bows to Modern Realities; As VMI Continues to
Bar Women, Washington and Lee Terms its Coeducation a Success, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
1990, at D1; and Mississippi University for Women (MUW) in Columbus, Mississippi, see
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
MUW integrated in reaction to events immediately following the Supreme Court's
holding in Hogan. In Hogan, the Court held that prohibiting male students from taking
classes for credit in a nursing school was unconstitutional. Id. at 733. The local radio
announced the decision, and within 30 minutes two lawyers with male clients appeared
in the admissions office requesting admission to the undergraduate university. Telephone
Interview with Nancy Finn, Office of Admissions, Mississippi Univ. for Women (Oct. 17,
1990). Rather than litigate the case, MUW's Board of Visitors agreed to change the entire
university's female-only admissions policy. Id.
35. Locin, supra note 21, at 1. The Chairman of the Committee is Elmon Gray, a
Democrat from Sussex, Virginia, and the sole VMI alumnus in the Virginia General
Assembly. See MANUAL OF THE SENATE 114 (1988); HOUSE OF DELEGATES MANUAL 1988-89;
see also Jack Anderson & Donald Baker, Alumnus in Senate Acts to Let VMI Have its
Day in Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1991, at D5. The admissions policy is set by the Board
of Visitors pursuant to state law. VA. CODE ANN. S 23-104 (Michie 1985).
36. John Harris, Terry Asks Court to Approve VMI's Male-Only Admissions Policy;
'Federal Encroachment' in Education Cited, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1990, at B1.
37. See Attorneys Ready to Begin Jousting over VMl Lawsuit, UPI, June 2,1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. An additional indication of alumni support is that a
higher percentage of VMI alumni contribute to their alma mater than do alumni from
any other public university or college in the United States. See f989 Va. Acts 2232.
38. The stated goals of the rat system are:
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impersonal in its application, tending to remove wealth and
former station in life as factors in one's standing as a cadet, and
ensuring equal opportunity for all to advance by personal effort
and to enjoy those returns that are earned."'' Judy Mann less
charitably describes the rat system as "ritualistic physical and
psychological punishments '" 40 and says that VMI is "more like a
medieval time warp, in which a brotherhood is forged through
sadomasochistic rituals in a forgotten monastery supported by
the state for its own Byzantine purposes. '41
VMI's catalogue explains:
Throughout most of the "rat year," the new cadet walks at
rigid attention a prescribed route inside barracks known as
the "rat line," and doubletimes up and down barracks stairs.
He must be punctilious in keeping his shoes shined, his uniform
spotless, his hair cut, and in shaving daily. He must memorize
school songs, yells, and other information.4
If anything, this description is an understatement. When the
catalogue says the rat must walk "at rigid attention," it refers
to the "strain" position in which the rat's chin is "tightly pulled
in, his eyes trained steely ahead even while climbing stairs at
doubletime or reading announcements off the chalk board, fists
clenched, arms squeezed to his sides so that no daylight shows,
chest stuck out and shoulders thrown back."' If he should dare
stand in the way of an upperclassmen, that upperclassmen shouts
"move," and the rat moves. He must be prepared upon command
"to recite the day's menu or a random excerpt from the 'rat's
[T]o teach or promote the following in the shortest span of time possible:
1. Excellence in all things, particularly academics.
2. Military bearing, discipline, and conduct.
3. Self-control, humility, and self-restraint.
4. Respect for authority and the forms of military courtesy.
5. Habits of neatness, cleanliness, orderliness, punctuality, and the impor-
tance of perfection of detail.
6. The history and traditions of VMI and cadet life.
7. Class unity and the "brother rat" spirit that result from shared experi-
ences in a stern and challenging environment.
CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 14.
39. I&
40. Mann, supra note 20, at B3.
41. Id-
42. CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 14.
43. Locin, supra note 21, at 1.
44. Id.
1992] 497
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bible,' the 64-page palm-sized handbook" filled with the "school
songs, yells, and other information" referenced in the catalogue.4 5
If the rat fails to recite something in the book properly, he must
immediately perform twenty pushups, and if a "Brother Rat"
sees him doing the pushups, he must also drop and perform
twenty pushups out of "brotherly love. ' 46 In addition to the
tribulations to which the catalogue refers, an inspector will al-
ways find something wrong with the rat's room or uniform.47 In
the mess hall, the rat "sit[s] perched on the front three inches
of the chair, knees clamped, head down in obeisance, unable to
look up from the plate."48
VMI students must abide by an honor code in which "lying,
cheating, stealing and the breaking of one's word are considered
violations.."49 A cadet may plead guilty to a violation of the honor
code and resign; however, if the Honor Court finds him guilty,
the school dishonorably dismisses him.s° The system is so effective
that dormitory rooms have no locks and cadets frequently leave
valuables in open drawers without fear of theft.51
The Case History
The Department of Justice first attacked VMI's admissions
policy in a January 30, 1990, letter by demanding that "VMI
immediately abandon its 'single-sex admissions policy' and that
it undertake 'appropriate recruitment activities. . promptly.' "52
The Commonwealth responded to the letter by filing for declar-
atory and injunctive relief 3 and by claiming: "Admission of
women to the VMI undergraduate four-year program is not
necessary to provide equal educational opportunities for women
within the Virginia system of Higher education." 4 Virginia also
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 12.
50. I&
51. Id.
52. Counterclaim at 2, United States v. Virginia, No. 90-0126-R (WI). Va. filed Mar. 28,
1990) (quoting letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General Civil
Rights Division, to Lawrence D. Wilder, Governor, Commonwealth of Va., and Joseph M.
Spivey III, President, Board of Visitors of VMI (Jan. 30, 1990) (copy on file with the
William and Mary Law Review)).
'53. Complaint at 1, Virginia Military Inst. v. Thornburgh, No. 90-0083-R (W.D. Va. filed
Feb. 5, 1990).
54. Id at 3.
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claimed an important governmental interest in providing a di-
verse system of higher education which an all-male VMI substan-
tially furthered.55 DOJ later filed its own suit against VMI.e
VMI's alumni society filed a third suit. The court consolidated
the three suits in November, 1990, and the Honorable Jackson
L. Kiser of the Western District of Virginia handed down his
decision on June 14, 1991.P7 DOJ appealed on August 12, 1991.58
The Virginia Higher Education System
The Commonwealth's claim rested upon the "diversity of the
Virginia higher education system,"59 the goal of which is to
provide students the "fullest opportunity to learn and to develop
55. According to the Complaint,
The state-supported system of higher education in Virginia is richly di-
verse, consisting of both public and private institutions with differentiated
missions, coordinated by law through the State Council of Higher Education.
The Commonwealth's important interest in preserving the diversity of the
system and a balance in the educational choices offered is reflected in the
statutory responsibility of the State Council ....
... In Virginia, the public and private institutions complement each other.
State policies and financial support maintain the private sector as a necessary
and critical component in the Virginia higher education system. Virginia's
private institutions are beneficiaries of a number of state initiatives and
financial support designed to maintain their viability and specialized contri-
bution to the diversity of the Virginia higher education system. Information
resources, technological and planning support, tuition grants and faculty
incentives are provided to maximize the contributions and potential of these
institutions.
Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
56. See Counterclaim, United States v. Virginia, No. 90-126-R. The DOJ filed suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 2000c-6 (1988). This statute confers standing upon the Attorney
General upon receiving a signed, written statement that a college denied someone
admission by reason of "race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id. The section
allows the Attorney General to prosecute the suit when he deems the person unable to
initiate and maintain a suit due to the expense of the suit or because it may jeopardize
"the personal safety, employment, or economic standing of such person or persons, their
families, or their property." Id. S 2000c-6(b). The Attorney General's Office refused to
release the name of the woman who initiated this suit by filing a complaint with the
Department of Justice. See Complaint at 2, United States v. Virginia, No. 90-0126-R
(omitting specific reference to individual). This Note does not discuss the specifics of the
ongoing litigation; nor does it address possible due process defects resulting from
nondisclosure of the real-party-in-interest's name, because any such defects could be
remedied by the involvement of another plaintiff.
57. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (WiD. Va. 1991), appeal
docketed, No. 90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991).
58. Virginia, No. 90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991).
59. See supra note 55.
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intellectual and mental capacities. 63 The system is coordinated
through the Virginia Council of Higher Education, 61 which visits
and studies programs of higher education6 2 and reviews all changes
in mission statements63 and academic programs." The system
includes forty-five four-year colleges and universities and twenty-
seven two-year colleges.6 5 Currently two of these colleges are
single-gender institutions for men,66 and five are private single-
gender institutions for women.6 7 Over twenty of these colleges
offer ROTC programs, and two have residential cadet corps. 3 As
recently as 1970, the Commonwealth of Virginia operated five
single-sex colleges; currently VMI is the only remaining single-
sex state-supported college in Virginia.69
Single-sex education has flourished in private Virginia colleges
at least partially because these colleges receive funding from the
state through Tuition Assistance Grants 70 The 1990-92 biennial
budget allocated $40,094,000 to these grants.7 ' Although the grants
are nominally awarded to the students attending the colleges,
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-30.39 (Michie 1985).
61. Id. S 23-9.6:1.
62. Id. S 23-9.6:1(12).
63. Id. S 23-9.6:1(1).
64. Id.
65. CENTER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE, VIRGINIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT § 5.22 (1989).
66. These are Hampden-Sydney College and VMI. See United States v. Virginia, 766
F. Supp. 1407, 1420 (W.D. Va. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12,
1991). In the Fall of 1989, only 944 of the 2256 men enrolled in single-sex colleges in
Virginia were enrolled at Hampden-Sydney. Id.
67. These are Hollins College, Sweet Briar College, Randolph-Macon Women's College,
Southern Seminary College, and Mary Baldwin College. Id. The total enrollment for these
colleges in the Fall of 1989 was 3850 women. Id.
68. Counterclaim by Commonwealth of Virginia at 3, United States v. Virginia, No. 90-
0126-R (W.D. Va. filed Mar. 28, 1990).
69. See Kirstein v. University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184, 186 (E.D. Va. 1970). The
other single-sex institutions were the University of Virginia, which adopted an integration
policy permitting the admission of women in the Fall of 1970 in response to Kirstein, see
Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1419; Mary Washington College of the University of Virginia,
which also adopted an integration policy by admitting men in 1970, see id. at 1418;
Longwood College, which adopted an integration policy by admitting men in June 1976,
Interview with Elizabeth Marrs, 1979 graduate of Longwood College, in Charlottesville,
Va. (June 30, 1991); and Radford College, which adopted its integration policy by admitting
men in 1972, see Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1418.
70. See Tuition Assistance Grant Act, VA. CODE ANN. S 23-38.12, .15 (Michie 1985).
71. 1990 Va. Acts 1966. The grants are limited to "students attending certain private
colleges in Virginia." VA. CODE ANN. S 23-38.45. During the 1989-90 biennium, the
Commonwealth spent $5,448,871 on the Grant Program for the six private single-sex
institutions in Virginia. Letter from James A. McLean, Coordinator of Affirmative Action
and Student Research, Commonwealth of Virginia, Council of Higher Education (Feb. 21,
1991) (on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
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the grant money goes directly to the private school coffers.7 2 For
purposes of constitutional analysis, any distinction between this
aid and state support for "public colleges" is pure sophistry.
REVIEW OF EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
Early Cases
The 1971 case of Reed v. Reed 5 was the first case in which the
Supreme Court rigorously applied the Equal Protection Clause
to gender discrimination. Reed involved an Idaho probate code
regulating applications for appointment as administrator of a
decedent's estate7 4 The code gave preference to men over women
who bore the same degree of relationship to the decedent.75 The
Court divined two possible benefits from Idaho's claim that the
objective of the law was to eliminate areas of controversy when
two or more equally qualified persons desired the position.76 The
first benefit was the reduction of the probate court workload.
Although the Court admitted that this reduction was a legitimate
state objective,7 it harshly condemned the means utilized by the
State as "mak[ing] the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause."78 The second benefit
the Court discussed was the alleviation of intrafamily disputes.
The Court simply stated that the choice of this dispute resolution
method could "not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of
sex."
79
Both alleged benefits were derived by denying women equal
access to the state's decisionmaking process. If a dispute arose
between two equally qualified men, a probate court would hold
a hearing and determine who was best qualified to administer
the estate;e but, if the dispute was between a woman and a man,
that woman had no opportunity to show she was more qualified
72. Because the grants are for tuition, the private school is the ultimate beneficiary of
the program. See VA. CODE ANN. SS 23-38.15, .17:1.
73. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see Richard W. Brunette, Jr., Single Sex Public Schools: The Last
Bastion of "Separate but Equal"?, 1977 DUKE L.J. 259, 261.
74. Reed, 404 U.S. at 72-73.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 76.
77. Id.
78. I&
79. Id. at 77.
80. See id. at 76.
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than the man to administer the estate8 l In reality, the equal
protection harm was a denial of due process.
In reaching the unanimous decision in Reed, the Court did not
develop a heightened standard of review. It merely applied the
rational basis test enunciated in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,2
that a classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."1' 3 Two more years
would pass before the Court would consider developing a height-
ened standard of review for sex discrimination.P
Strict Scrutiny in Gender Discrimination
The Court first attempted to develop a higher standard of
review in the 1973 case of Frontiero v. Richardson 5 Frontiero
involved a law requiring military women to show their husbands
were dependents in order to obtain greater housing allowances
and medical benefits.8 6 The law did not require a man to make
the same showing concerning his wife.1 Lieutenant Sharon Fron-
tiero applied for and was denied increased benefits because her
husband did not qualify as a dependent under the relevant
statute.8 A plurality of the Court concluded that "classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based on race, alienage, or
national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.""
Although the plurality applied strict scrutiny to that gender-
based classification, Justice Powell's concurrence suggested that
the "far-reaching implications of such a holding" should occasion-
ally be withheld.9 As the plurality stated: "[W]hat differentiates
sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability
81. See id.
82. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
83. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting Royster, 253 U.S. at 415).
84. See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
85. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
86. See id. at 678-79.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 680.
89. Id. at 688.
90. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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to perform or contribute to society."91 That sex may sometimes
bear a relationship to one's ability is a result of fundamental
gender differences.9 Because these differences do not uniformly
affect all members of each sex, any law allocating sufficient
procedural safeguards on a sex-neutral basis should be constitu-
tional.
The result in Frontiero demonstrates the superiority of a
procedural due process analysis. The plurality noted that saving
the government money may have constituted a sufficiently com-
pelling interest to justify different treatment, but that
the Government must demonstrate ... that it is actually
cheaper to grant increased benefits with respect to all male
members, than it is to determine which male members are in
fact entitled to such benefits and to grant increased benefits
only to those members whose wives actually meet the depend-
ency requirement.9 3
The Court's decision, however, struck down only that portion of
the statute that required women members of the military to
prove that their husbands were dependents.94 By removing the
disability of proof for women, all armed services members became
entitled to obtain benefits to which they may not have otherwise
been entitled. As one commentator explained:
Had Frontiero been viewed through the lens of procedural due
process, it would have become apparent that the appropriate
remedy was not to have extended the windfall to equally
undeserving persons, but to have required individualized de-
terminations of need in the cases of male as well as female
members of the service.95
Frontiero was not a difficult case. Had the plurality decided
the case on the logic of Reed, it would have been an eight-to-one
decision with Justice Rehnquist as the lone dissenter.9 The split
91. Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
92. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
93. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689.
94. See id. at 690-91.
95. Paul Savoy, The Spiritual Nature of Equality: Natural Principles of Constitutional
Law, 28 How. L.J. 809, 867-68 (1985).
96. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the
rational basis test in Reed); cf. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Mr.
Justice Stewart concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the statutes before us work an
invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution:'); id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring)
(joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackman, J.) ("In my view, we can and should decide this
case on the authority of Reed and reserve for the future any expansion of its rationale:').
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on the Court resulted from the status of the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA),97 which would most likely have caused
the Court to adopt strict scrutiny in cases of gender discrimi-
nation.98 Justice Powell was unwilling to adopt strict scrutiny
because
[t]he Equal Rights Amendment ... if adopted will resolve the
substance of this precise question . . . . By acting prematurely
and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a
decisional responsibility at the very time when state legisla-
tures, functioning within the traditional democratic process,
are debating the proposed Amendment. It seems to me that
this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political
decision which is currently in process of resolution does not
reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative proc-
esses."
While analyzing the Reed decision that had recognized the
substantial equality of capabilities between the sexes,100 the Fron-
tiero plurality suggested that this equality of capabilities should
result in equality of status and indicated that a new gender
discrimination standard was necessary to further this goal.101
Although Frontiero was a plurality opinion, it represents the
high-water mark of gender discrimination Equal Protection Clause
analysis; the Court later rejected gender as an impermissible
classification in Rostker v. Goldberg.102
97. The text of the proposed amendment was:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
H.J.R. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
98. See Patricia Werner Lamar, Comment, The Expansion of Constitutional and Statu-
tory Remedies for Sex Segregation in Education: The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 32 EMORY L.J. 1111, 1157 n.164 (1983).
99. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring) (joined by Burger, C.J., and
Blackmun, J.).
100. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
101. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688-91.
102. 453 U.S. 57, 69 n.7 (1981) (quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10 (1974))
("It is clear that '[g]ender has never been rejected as an impermissible classification in
all instances.' ).
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The Current Standard
Reed v. Reed'0 3 and Frontiero v. Richardson0 4 involved proce-
dural barriers constructed on the basis of sex. In both cases, the
direct harms to the disfavored class were procedural in nature,
and the effective harm was the denial of some governmental
benefit. Following Reed and Frontiero, a host of similar cases
almost uniformly struck down laws imposing gender-based pro-
cedural barriers.1 5 The Court enunciated the current Equal Pro-
tection Clause test for gender discrimination in 1976 when it
faced a different kind of harm in Craig v. Boren.106
Craig involved an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale
of beer containing between one-half of one percent (0.5O/o) alcohol
by volume and three point two percent (3.2%) alcohol by weight
to men under twenty-one years of age and women under eighteen
years of age.'O The case was brought by a private liquor seller
and, unlike Frontiero and Reed, did not involve the procedural
mechanisms through which the government distributed bene-
fits.1 8 Referring to unspecified "previous cases," the Court es-
tablished the current standard for gender discrimination by stating
that "[tlo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases es-
tablish that classifications by gender must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."'0 9
103. 404 U.S. 71.
104. 411 U.S. 677.
105. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional
a law permitting mothers, but not fathers, unilaterally to block adoptions of their children);
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional a law denying male
eligibility for alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201-02 (1977) (invalidating law
requiring widowers, but not widows, to prove actual dependency on a deceased spouse
to qualify for survivor's benefits); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524-25 (1975)
(holding Sixth Amendment right to a jury invalidates conviction if law requires women,
but not men, to register for jury duty). But see Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 357-59
(1979) (upholding Georgia law requiring men to go through a legitimization procedure
before they may sue on behalf of their illegitimate children).
106. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
107. See id. at 191-92.
108. Although state governments have the right to regulate the sale and consumption
of alcoholic beverages, U.S. CONST. amend. 21; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. tit. 4 (Michie 1988)
(dealing with alcoholic beverage control), any person of legal age can purchase such
beverages, see, e.g., id. S 4-62 (establishing 21 as the minimum drinking age). This right,
thus, is distinguishable from rights that states vest in particular people such as estate
administrators and divorced parents.
109. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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The Court did not question Oklahoma's claim that it had an
important governmental objective in promoting traffic safety. 10
The controversy centered on the degree to which forbidding sales
of certain alcoholic beverages to males between eighteen and
twenty years of age furthered that objective."' The State pro-
duced statistics that showed that men in the eighteen- to twenty-
year-old age group were more likely to be arrested for both
driving under the influence and drunkenness than women, but
these statistics failed to indicate that age bore any relation to
the comparative arrest rate." 2 In fact, the findings indicated
"even more male involvement in such arrests at later ages.""' 3
Although these statistics showed that men within the age group
were eleven times more likely to be arrested for alcohol related
driving offenses than women," 4 the Court found that "[w]hile such
a disparity is not trivial in a statistical sense, it hardly can form
the basis for employment of a gender line as a classifying device.
Certainly if maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking and
driving, a correlation of 20 must be considered an unduly ten-
uous 'fit.' "115
Although the statistical "fit" may have been "unduly tenuous,"
the means-end fit between the law and its stated purpose of
reducing alcohol-related driving offenses was even more tenuous.
The statute allowed an exemption for license holders who wished
to dispense 3.2/0 beer to their children,"6 and
when it is further recognized that Oklahoma's statute prohibits
only the selling of 3.2% beer to young males and not their
drinking the beverage once acquired (even after purchase by
their 18-20-year-old female companions), the relationship be-
tween gender and traffic safety becomes far too tenuous to
satisfy Reed's requirement that the gender-based difference be
substantially related to achievement of the statutory objec-
tive." 7
110. Id. at 199-200.
111. Id. at 200.
112. Id at 200 n.8. During 1973, 427 males were arrested for driving under the influence
in Oklahoma compared to only 24 females. Id. The arrest totals for drunkenness included
966 males and 102 females. Id.
113. Id. (citing Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (W.D. Okla. 1975)).
114. The actual statistics showed that 2% of males were arrested for alcohol-related
driving offenses, but only 0.18% of females were arrested. Id. at 201.
115. Id. at 201-02.
116. Id. at 213 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 204.
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Statistics and Stereotypes
The Court further explained its stance on statistics in Craig
v. Boren,"8 when it stated, "proving broad sociological proposi-
tions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably
is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the
Equal Protection Clause."" 9 To buttress the danger it saw in
using statistics, the Court related drinking tendencies among
adolescent males and females to those among racial groups.20
The Court then noted that "the principles embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statis-
tically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the
drinking tendencies of aggregate groups."'12
In declaring sociological statistics an impermissible justification
for differences in group treatment, the Court focused on an
analytical strand that first crept into gender discrimination de-
cisions in Stanton v. Stanton.'2 In Stanton, a divorce decree
provided for the cessation of child support payments when the
children attained their majority.'2 A Utah statute defined the
age of majority as eighteen for females and twenty-one for
malesm The difference in ages was justified, inter alia, by the
notion that women tended to marry earlier and leave the home,
whereas boys went to college to prepare themselves to support
the home.12 The Court swiftly struck down this rationale, stating:
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the
rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace
and the world of ideas .... To distinguish between [the gen-
ders] on educational grounds ... is self-serving: if the female
is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be
expected to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her
118. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
119. Id. at 204.
120. Id. at 208 n.22. The argument that sexual discrimination is equivalent to racial
discrimination has great intuitive appeal; the analogy, however, is imperfect, and one
should not accept it blindly. See supra notes 10-11 for a discussion of group differences
between men and women that could not easily be expanded to cover racial groups. Indeed,
one reason the Court may have adopted the current standard with its "diaphanous and
elastic" terminology is that the analogy to race is imperfect. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
121. Craig, 429 U.S. at 208-09.
122. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
123. Id. at 9.
124. I&
125. Id. at 10.
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education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing
society has long imposed. 128
Stereotypes are best seen as overbroad generalizations, but
determining which generalizations reflect a stereotype has some-
times stymied the Court. In Kahn v. Shevin,12 the Court upheld
a $500 Florida property tax exemption given to widows, but not
widowers'28 because "[t]here can be no dispute that the financial
difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other
State exceed those facing the man."129 The Court distinguished
Kahn from Frontiero v. Richardson'" by claiming that in Fron-
tiero, "the Government denied its female employees both sub-
stantive and procedural benefits granted males 'solely . .. for
administrative convenience.' "131
Three years after Kahn, the Court again addressed the issue
of preferential treatment for widows in Califano v. Goldfarb.3 2
Califano involved a statute that required widowers, but not
widows, to prove dependency on their dead spouse to obtain
survivors' benefits.'3 The Court struck down the distinction as
being supported only by "'archaic and overbroad generalizations'
.. . that are more consistent with 'the role-typing society has
long imposed' than with contemporary reality."' The Court
attempted to distinguish Califano and Kahn by stating that
whereas Kahn related to a presumption of need on the part of
the widow, the statute in Califano related to dependency.13 5 In
his dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted the weakness of the
distinction 3 6 which served as little more than a veneer to hide
the change in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.
126. Id at 14-15 (citation omitted).
127. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). The Court decided Kahn before its 1975 opinion in Stanton
addressed the question of perpetuating stereotypes.
128. Id at 352.
129. Id at 353.
130. 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see supra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
131. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355 (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690). With due respect to
the Court in Kahn, the majority omits the justification proffered in Frontiero "that
Congress might reasonably have concluded that it would be both cheaper and easier
simply. ..to presume that wives of male members are financially dependent upon their
husbands." Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).
132. 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 201.
134. Id. at 207 (citations omitted) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508
(1975) and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975)).
135. Id. at 212-13.
136. Justice Rehnquist stated:
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The question of stereotype was critical in the case of Parham
v. Hughes.3" In Parham, Georgia law allowed an illegitimate
father to legitimize his child without marrying the child's mother.'
The law provided that the father could gain paternal rights in
the child only through a legitimization process.' 9 This provision
served the state's interest in having the father "identify himself
[and] undertake his paternal responsibilities.' 40 The Court found
the statute did not create an overbroad generalization about men
as a class' 4' but rather "distinguish[ed] between [those] fathers
who h[ad] legitimated their children and those who h[ad] not."'1
Unlike Stanton, in which the Court described different treatment
of the sexes as an example of overbroad generalization that
coincided "with the role-typing society has long imposed,"' any
generalizations inherent in the Georgia law were attributable to
choices by the member of the disadvantaged class.'" In providing
a procedure to counter the generalization, the Court approved a
means by which a gender-based law could avoid the stereotype
curse.
The comparisons between Califano, Parham, and Kahn high-
light the emergence of stereotypes in determining whether a
classification is legitimate. Unfortunately, determining whether
a classification perpetuates a stereotype is a difficult, subjective
exercise. To determine whether an adequate fit exists between
the evil that legislators intended the law to address and the
A waiver of the dependency prerequisite for benefits, in the case of this
same class of aged widows, under a program explicitly aimed at the assistance
of needy groups, appears to be 'well within the holding of the Kahn case,
which upheld a flat $500 exemption to widows, without any consideration of
need.
Id. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (plurality opinion).
138. Id- at 349 n.2 (citing GA. CODE ANN. S 74-103 (Michie 1978)).
139. Id. The Court did not address the issue of the different treatment of fathers and
mothers.
140. I& at 356.
141. I& at 356-57.
142. Id- at 356.
143. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975).
144. See Parham, 441 U.S. at 355-56 nn.7-9. The Parham holding is distinguishable from
the decision in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), which involved a New York
statute that gave an unwed mother the right to block unilaterally the adoption of her
child by withholding her consent. Id. at 385-87. The child's father had no equivalent right.
Id. New York claimed the law reflected "a fundamental difference between maternal and
paternal relations" with the child. I& at 388. The Court rejected the idea that maternal
and paternal roles are "invariably different in importance" and struck down the statute's
"broad, gender-based" classification. Id. at 389.
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classification it imposes, finders of fact are themselves subject
to influences of stereotypes. As in Frontiero, a procedural due
process approach to Kahn would have reached a result consistent
"with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protec-
tion Clause."145 The resulting outcome would have achieved this
result without forcing the Court to make spurious distinctions
between cases with identical facts. Most importantly, however,
a procedural due process approach would have rendered a con-
sistent guide for future cases. Today's stereotype may be tomor-
row's truth just as much as today's truth may be tomorrow's
stereotype.14
The Court will uphold discriminatory treatment when it fails
to find that the classification perpetuates a stereotype. For ex-
ample, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,147 the Court upheld a statutory
scheme whereby male naval officers who failed to receive pro-
motion from lieutenant to lieutenant commander for a second
time were subject to mandatory discharge from the Navy without
regard to length of service. 148 Female officers were allowed thir-
teen years to advance between the grades. 4 9 The Court stated
that "the different treatment of men and women . . . under...
[the statute] reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations,
but, instead the demonstrable fact that male and female line
officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to
opportunities for professional service."1 0
The Court also used the statutory combat exclusion to justify
a statute requiring only men to register for the draft in Rostker
v. Goldberg.'5' The Court in Rostker, however, seemed uncomfort-
able with distinctions drawn from the combat exclusion and
warned:
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the
Constitution when it acts in ... military affairs. In that area,
as any other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of
the Due Process Clause, but the tests and limitations to be
applied may differ because of the military context. We of course
145. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
146. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) ("In approaching this
problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.").
147. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
148. Id. at 499 n.1, 501, 510.
149. Id. at 500 n.2.
150. Id. at 508.
151. 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).
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do not abdicate our ultimate responsibility to decide the con-
stitutional question, but simply recognize that the Constitution
itself requires such deference to congressional choice. 152
This discomfort appears to be partially due to the fact that the
Court never addressed the constitutional validity of the combat
exclusion itself.L1 This omission resembles the Court's approach
in Parham, in which the Court avoided determining the consti-
tutionality of excluding unwed mothers from the requirement
that they legitimatize their children before acquiring parental
rights.' One must wonder whether the distinctions drawn in
Schlesinger, Rostker, and Parham will one day seem like manifes-
tations of unfounded stereotypes. Congress, in fact, is considering
changing the combat exclusion laws.15
GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION AND MISSISSIPPI
UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN V. HOGAN 56
The Constitution and Single Sex Schools Before 1982
When the United States Supreme Court overturned the doc-
trine of "separate but equal" in Brown v. Board of Education,5 7
it declared that "education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments,"'1 and it noted that "[c]ompulsory
school attendance laws . . . demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society."'5 9 The Court
also observed that quality in education is dependent on more
than equality among tangible factors'60 and focused much of its
inquiry upon the psychological harm inflicted upon children de-
152. Id- (citations omitted).
153. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution does not contain an Equal Protection
Clause, but courts have inferred one through its Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Schlesinger,
419 U.S. at 500 n.3.
154. In practice, such a requirement could be administered easily when the child's
birth certificate is completed. A child's legitimacy is a function of the legal relationship
between the natural parents. Because the state's strongest interest in the child's legiti-
macy is to ensure that the father assist with the care of the child, see supra note 140
and accompanying text, such a "legitimating" procedure for mothers identified through
the birth process would usually be a mere redundancy.
155. See infra note 230.
156. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
157. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
158. Id. at 493.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
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nied the right to attend school with other children solely on the
basis of race:161
[Tihe policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferi-
ority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of negro children and
to deprive them of . . . the benefits they would receive in a
raciallyl integrated school system.162
The broad phrasing of the Court's holding in Brown that "in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has
no place"'1 would seem to foreclose any possibility of maintaining
single-sex schooling. The Court in Brown, however, ruled on an
educational system that mandated complete segregation and
promulgated this ruling before Reed v. Reed'" applied the Equal
Protection Clause to gender discrimination.
The first case to address the constitutionality of single-sex
public education was Vorchheimer v. School District.165 The City
of Philadelphia maintained a school system that involved four
types of high schools with differing enrollment requirements. 66
These schools were denominated as technical, magnet, and com-
prehensive high schools that were generally open to both sexes. 67
Additionally, the system included two single-sex "academic" high
schools that offered only college preparatory classes.'6 Only about
seven percent of the school-age population was eligible to attend
the academic schools. 69 The plaintiff was a gifted teenage girl
who graduated from her junior high school with honors and who
would have been eligible to go to Central High, the boys' high
school, except that she was female.170 Both Central High School
and Girls High, its female equivalent, were "comparable in qual-
161. Id. at 493-95.
162. Id. at 494 (quoting the trial court in "the Kansas case," Brown v. Board of Educ.,
98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev'd, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
163. Id. at 495.
164. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
165. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S.
703 (1977).
166. Id. at 881.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
512 [Vol. 33:489
GENDER DISCRIMINATION
ity, academic standing, and prestige."'171 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that although the plaintiff
had a valid interest in an expanded freedom of choice,172 the
expansion of her choice would result in heavy costs that would
outweigh the harm she suffered:
[A]ll public single-sex schools would have to be abolished. The
absence of these schools would stifle the ability of the local
school board to continue with a respected ediicational meth-
odology. It follows too that those students and parents who
prefer an education in a public, single-sex school would be
denied their freedom of choice. The existence of private schools
is no more an answer to those people than it is to the plaintiff.73
The Vorchheimer decision was supported by the District Court
of South Carolina's decision in Williams v. McNair,174 which held
that Winthrop College, an all-female public liberal arts college in
Rock Hill, South Carolina, could constitutionally deny male ap-
plicants admission to the school on the sole basis of sex.175 The
gravamen of the opinion was that although single-sex education
was not universally accepted as superior to coeducation, substan-
tial belief existed within the educational community that limiting
enrollment to one sex "offers better educational advantages"'176
and that "the Constitution does not require that a classification
'keep abreast of the latest' in educational opinion, especially when
there remains a respectable opinion to the contrary." 177 The
court's declaration in Vorchheimer that "the special emotional
problems of the adolescent years are matters of human experi-
171. Id. at 882.
172. Id. at 888. The plaintiffs demonstration of harm was less than convincing. "She
submitted no factual evidence that attendance at Girls High would constitute psychological
or other injury." Id. at 882. She merely stated: "I just didn't like the impression ...
[Girls High] gave me. I didn't think I would be able to go there for three years and not
be harmed in any way by it." Id. Additionally, although she was "dissatisfied" with the
education she was receiving at the comprehensive school that she attended in lieu of
Girls High at the time of the suit, she was going to be eligible for early admission to
college at the end of the eleventh grade. Id. at 882 n.3. Central High has since integrated,
and Girls High is the only single-sex public high school remaining in the country. Mary
Koepke, A School of Their Own, TEACHER, Feb. 1991, at 44.
173. Vorchheim ir, 532 F.2d at 888.
174. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), af'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
175. See id. at 137-38.
176. Id. at 137.
177. Id.
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ence and have led some educational experts to opt for one-sex
high schools"'178 echoed this sentiment.
Both opinions stressed that the interest of diversity in educa-
tion is a goal that may justify discriminatory treatment along
gender lines. As the court in Williams said of Winthrop College
and the higher educational system in South Carolina,
[lut must be remembered, too, that Winthrop is merely a part
of an entire system of State-supported higher education. It
may not be considered in isolation. If the State operated only
one college and that college was Winthrop, there can be no
question that to deny males admission thereto would be im-
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. But, as we
have already remarked, these plaintiffs have a complete range
of state institutions they may attend. They are free to attend
either an all-male or, if they wish, a number of co-educational
institutions at various locations over the State.179
The court in Vorchheimer was more blatant in its analysis: "Equal
educational opportunities should be available to both sexes in
any intellectual field. . . .While t[he] policy [of single-sex high
schools] has limited acceptance on its merits, it does have its
basis in a theory of equal benefit and not discriminatory denial."'18
Thus, "separate but equal" has a place in public education with
respect to gender.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan 8'
Although the United States Supreme Court affirmed both
Vorchheimer v. School District182 and Williams v. McNair,'8 nei-
ther case received a full opinion. The Court did not address the
178. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 887 (3d Cir. 1976), a'd per curiam by
an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
179. Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 137-38.
180. Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 887. In his dissent in Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), Justice Powell stated:
Generations of our finest minds, both among educators and students, have
believed that single-sex, college-level institutions afford distinctive benefits.
There are many persons, of course, who have different views. But simply
because there are these differences is no reason-certainly none of consti-
tutional dimension-to conclude that no substantial state interest is served
when such a choice is made available.
Id. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. 458 U.S. 718.
182. 532 F.2d 880.
183. 316 F. Supp. 134.
514 [Vol. 33:489
GENDER DISCRIMINATION
constitutionality of single-sex public education until it decided
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan'8 in 1982.
Joe Hogan was a male registered nurse who did not have a
baccalaureate degree in nursing.'8 He worked and resided in
Columbus, Mississippi, where the Mississippi University for
Women (MUW) operated a nursing school offering such degrees.18
MUW limited admission to the nursing school to women.18' Mis-
sissippi also operated two other nursing programs offering bac-
calaureate degrees in nursing, but these schools were a substantial
distance from Mr. Hogan's home.' s8
The majority claimed it did not reach the issue of whether the
state may permissibly provide "separate but equal" education for
males and females because the State of Mississippi did not have
any all-male nursing schools.18 Instead, it applied the same gender
discrimination test developed in Craig v. BorenW9 with the clear
addition of the Stanton v. Stanton'9' stereotype analysis.
The Court asked first whether the State was trying to further
"important governmental objectives"'' 9 and had an "exceedingly
persuasive justification"' 93 for operating an all-female nursing
school. Because females dominated the nursing profession, the
Court found that MUW's admission policy served no remedial
purposes.19 Additionally, the majority rejected MUW's argument
that the gender-based classification was "substantially and di-
184. 458 U.S. 718.
185. Id. at 720.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 735 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). These schools were 178 miles and 147
miles, respectively, from Columbus, Mississippi. Id.
189. Id at 720 n.1. By applying a test other than "separate but equal," the Court
essentially made the "separate but equal" argument of Vorchheimer and Williams a nullity
as it applies to single-sex education. Unless the Court deviates from the Hogan analysis,
whether "separate but equal" institutions exist for each gender is constitutionally irrel-
evant. The Court could, of course, revive the test in controversies in which such
institutions do exist, but by not requiring them to exist, the Court indicated that a state
can support an institution for one gender and not for the other without transgressing
constitutional bounds.
190. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
191. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
192. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
150 (1980)).
193. Id. at 724 (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
194. Id. at 729. Moreover, the Court noted: "Officials of the American Nurses Associ-
ation have suggested that excluding men from the field has depressed nurses' wages. . ..
To the extent [that] the exclusion of men has that effect, MUW's admissions policy
actually penalizes the very class the State purports to benefit." Id. at 729 n.15 (citations
omitted).
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rectly related to its proposed compensatory objective" 195 of en-
hancing educational quality in the nursing school. 19 As Justice
O'Connor stated, "MUW's policy of permitting men to attend
classes as auditors fatally undermines its claim that women, at
least those in the School of Nursing, are adversely affected by
the presence of men."1 97 Finally, the majority joined the stereo-
type analysis of Stanton to the Craig test when it stated:
MUW's policy of excluding males from admission to the School
of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing
as an exclusively woman's job. By assuring that Mississippi
allots more openings in its state-supported nursing schools to
women than it does to men, MUW's admissions policy lends
credibility to the old view that women, not men, should become
nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for
women a self-fulfilling prophecy. 19
That the Court limited the holding in Hogan to the nursing
school' 99 indicates the importance of this portion of the analysis.
195. Id. at 730.
196. See id. at 730-31.
197. Id. at 730. This reasoning implies that an even more discriminatory policy might
have had a stronger claim to constitutionality. If men had not been allowed to audit
classes, the gender purity of the student body would have allowed the belief that men
have an adverse impact on the instructional program to stand uncontradicted by actual
practices at the school. Evidence exists that integrated classes at other schools have a
different atmosphere than their single-sex counterparts. See Koepke, supra note 172, at
44-45; infra note 275.
One'reason the presence of men may not have noticeably impacted education at MUW
is the paucity of men who audited classes. During the 10 years preceding the case, men
audited an average of 14 classes per year. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 744 n.17 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The 1981-82 MUW bulletin listed 913 courses offered at the college for one
year. Id.
198. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30 (footnote omitted). A significant distinction between
professional and nonprofessional undergraduate education is that one generally expects
persons completing a professional education to enter that profession. Single-sex education
in an undergraduate college, however, produces a greater likelihood that the student will
enter a profession traditionally associated with the opposite sex. United States v. Virginia,
766 F. Supp. 1407, 1435 (W.D. Va. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12,
1991). Thus, the Court's concern in Hogan that MUW's policy of excluding males would
promote stereotypes in the professional world does not necessarily apply to VMI.
199. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723 n.7. The Court claims the narrowness of its holding was
because Joe Hogan's harm was only being denied admission to the nursing school, not
the undergraduate part of the campus. Id. The Court easily could have extended the
opinion to the entire University. The circuit court opinion implied that the admissions
policy of the entire University was unconstitutional, see id., and a summary affirmance
similar to that in Vorchheimer v. School District, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (allowing single-sex public high
schools), would have reached that result. Additionally, evidence indicating that men had
no adverse impact on the education of the nursing students would have been equally
applicable to the other schools of the University.
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The dissenting opinions in Hogan addressed other values the
Court may consider in the VMI action and other future gender
cases. Justice Blackmun warned that it may be time to retreat
from the "rigid rules in this area of claimed sex discrimination"2°°
because it leads to "needless conformity ' 01 and the loss of "values
that mean much to some people by forbidding the State to offer
them a choice while not depriving others of an alternative
choice."202
Applying whimsical public sentiment to timeless constitutional
values is a difficult and dangerous exercise.2 3 This is particularly
true in the area of gender discrimination.P 4 The analysis should
focus instead on replicable analytical tools such as balancing the
harm against the benefits and recognizing that the assertion of
rights by some may mean diminution in the rights of others. 205
Justice Powell implicitly adopted this approach in his dissent:
[The Court] gives no heed to the efforts of the State of
Mississippi to provide abundant opportunities for young men
and young women to attend coeducational institutions, and
none to the preferences of the more than 40,000 young women
who over the years have evidenced their approval of an all-
women's college by choosing Mississippi University for Women
(MUW) over seven coeducational universities within the
State .... It does so in a case instituted by one man, who
represents no class, and whose primary concern is personal
convenience.2°6
He further noted that the need for women's colleges still exists207
and that sexual segregation is distinguishable from racial segre-
gation because "[ilt was characteristic of racial segregation that
segregated facilities were offered, not as alternatives to increase
the choices available to blacks, but as the sole alternative. MUW
stands in sharp contrast."2 s
200. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 735.
202. See id- at 734.
203. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-51 (1896) (allowing enforced sepa-
ration of races by stating that equality "must be the result of natural affinities").
204. See supra notes 118-155 and accompanying text.
205. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), affd per curiam
by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
206. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 738-39.
208. Id. at 741 n.9.
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The Statutory Exemptions
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits most
publicly funded, undergraduate institutions from discriminating
on the basis of sex during the admissions process; however, the
amendments make exceptions for schools that are intended pri-
marily to train military personnel or members of the merchant
marine or that have always limited admissions to members of
one sex.2°9 MUW had limited its admissions for classes taken for
credit to women since it was chartered in 1884.210 The University
claimed that Title IX and its exceptions were in furtherance of
Congress' powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.211 The Court in Hogan denounced this reasoning, stating
that "Congress' power under § 5, however, is 'limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants
Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guar-
antees.' "212
One perplexing aspect of the Court's holding regarding the
statutory exception was that it reached the constitutional issue
even though it easily could have decided the case on other
grounds. Section 1681(a)(5) exempted only schools that "tradition-
ally and continually" since their establishment had admitted
members of only one sex 3 The statute makes no distinction
209. 20 U.S.C. S 1681 (1988) provides in part:
(a) Prohibition against discrimination; exceptions
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance, except that:
(1) Classes of educational institutions subject to prohibition in regard to
admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply only to insti-
tutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher
education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education;
(4) Educational institutions training individuals for military services or mer-
chant marine this section shall not apply to an educational institution whose
primary purpose is the training of individuals for the military services of
the United States, or the merchant marine;
(5) Public educational institutions with traditional and continuing admissions
policy in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public
institution . . . that traditionally and continually from its establishment has
had a policy of admitting only students of one sex.
Id-
210. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 719-20.
211. Id. at 722-23.
212. Id. at 732 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)).
213. See supra note 209 (quoting 20 U.S.C. S 1681 (1988)).
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between those schools that admit men for credit and those that
admit men solely to audit classes. Because MUW allowed men to
audit classes, a colorable argument existed that the statutory
exemption did not apply.214 Partially based on the Court's broad
reasoning in Hogan, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit found that the exemptions in § 1681(a)(4) for edu-
cational institutions "whose primary purpose is the training of
individuals for the military services of the United States or the
merchant marine 215 did not bar a sex discrimination suit.216
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE
The analysis of whether VMI should admit women requires
answers to four separate questions. The first question is whether
men and women are similarly situated with respect to admissions
to a military college.217 If the answer to that question is affir-
mative, one must determine whether classification by gender
serves important governmental objectives and whether the main-
tenance of VMI as an all-male institution is substantially related
to these objectives. 218 The final question is whether the mainte-
nance of VMI as an all-male institution perpetuates a stereotype
regarding gender roles.219
214. See Lamar, supra note 98, at 1138. Lamar suggests two additional ways in which
the Court could have circumvented the constitutional issue. First, because the School of
Nursing was established in 1971, one argument might be that Congress did not intend
the exemption for single-sex schools under 20 U.S.C. S 1681(aX5) to apply to schools with
only one year of tradition. Id. at 1137. This argument is less than compelling because it
requires entering the murky area of legislative intent to support a finding that directly
contradicts the language of the statute.
Lamar also suggests that, because Mr. Hogan sought an undergraduate degree that
was in essence a professional or vocational degree, the Court could have construed S
1681(aXl) to supersede the specific exemptions of S 1681(aX5) by extending the application
of the statute to "institutions of vocational education, professional education ... and
institutions of under graduate higher education." I& This approach would contradict the
general canon of statutory interpretation that the specific should govern the general. See
Naranjo v. Alverno College, 487 F. Supp. 635, 636, 638 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
215. See supra note 209 (quoting 20 U.S.C. S 1681 (1988)).
216. United States v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142, 150-51 (lst Cir.
1985) (holding that a maritime academy's single-sex admissions policy did not substantially
further an important governmental interest, and therefore finding the policy unconsti-
tutional).
217. "[Tlhis Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is
not invidious but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances." Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
218. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
219. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982) (declaring
that if a statutory objective reflects archaic, stereotypic ideas, the objective "itself is
illegitimate").
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Are Men and Women Similarly Situated with Respect to
Admissions to Military Colleges?
The Court has frequently displayed a great degree of deference
to congressional determinations that concern the armed forces.2
The Court's rulings concerning the training of troops reflect this
great respect.221 The stated purpose of such deference is that
"[i]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity
in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle,
and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equip-
ping, and control of a military force are essentially professional
military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches."222
The Court has exercised this broad deference to military judg-
ment with respect to gender discrimination when the issues relate
to the military's staffing and promotional policies;2 3 however, it
has deviated from this deferential stance when the different
treatment is unrelated to combat needs.224
Although only eighteen percent of VMI's graduates have cho-
sen military careers,225 the Institute is designed to prepare com-
220. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) ("[P]erhaps in no other
area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference:'). That this deference is derived
from the serious nature of warfare and Congress' express authority to declare war and
raise armies was first enunciated in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931),
when the Court reasoned: "In express terms Congress is empowered 'to declare war,'
* * .and 'to raise . . . armies,' which necessarily connotes the like power to say who shall
serve in them and in what way." Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
221.
I believe that the congressional and executive authority to prescribe and
regulate the training and weaponry of the National Guard, as set forth above,
clearly precludes any form of judicial regulation of the same .atters ....
Any such relief, whether it prescribed standards of training and weaponry
or simply ordered compliance with the standards set by Congress and/or the
Executive, would necessarily draw the courts into a nonjusticiable political
question, over which we have no jurisdiction.
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973) (quoting Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 619
(6th Cir. 1972) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting)).
222. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10).
223. See id. at 83 (upholding a male-only draft); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 510 (1975) (upholding preferential promotional treatment for women); Lewis v. United
States Army, 697 F. Supp. 1385, 1386, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (upholding United States
Army's policy of recruiting women only if they held high school diplomas or graduate
equivalency degrees, but not requiring the same academic achievements for male recruits).
224. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973) (striking down
preferential benefits for male service members).
225. See CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 7.
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bat leaders.2 VMI requires that every cadet engage in four
years of military training offered by ROTC, and upon "entering
the last two years of military instruction, qualified cadets are
encouraged to sign a formal contract with the service of their
choice and thereby enter a course of study that normally leads
to a military commission."2
That VMI attempts to prepare "combat leaders" may not be
dispositive on the issue of whether women are dissimilarly situ-
ated from men for purposes of admissions. Although Congress
has not completely abandoned the policy of segregating women
from combat, it has abandoned the policy of limiting military
academy admissions to men.229 Additionally, statutes limiting
combat opportunities for women apply only to the Navy and the
Air Force although they are an official part of Army and Marine
226. "It is the mission of the Virginia Military Institute to produce educated and
honorable men, . . . ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of national
peril." United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1425 (W.D. Va. 1991) (quoting the
Mission Study Committee of the VMI Board of Visitors), appeal docketed, No. 90-0126-R
(4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991). "The VMI experience promotes the development of qualities
important to effective combat leadership: Self control, self discipline, and the belief that
you must subordinate your own personal desires and well-being to the good of the whole
unit." Id. at 1427. When the service academies began accepting women, they changed the
wording of their mission statements from training "combat officers" to training "career
officers." STiEHm, supra note 10, at 37-38.
227. CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 12.
228. Id. Until January 27, 1990, VMI required all cadets to accept a commission if the
military offered it. The policy change was motivated by a change in the military policy
requiring cadets to make their decision to accept a commission at the end of two years.
The services had previously offered the commissions only at the end of four years of
training. If VMI had not changed the policy, cadets electing not to accept the commission
would have been forced to leave VMI after two years of cadetship. Traditionally, 70%
of the cadets accepted a commission upon graduation. VM7 Drops Commission Acceptance
Requirement, UPI, Feb. 9, 1990, avable in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
229. 10 U.S.C. 5 4342 note (1988) provides:
SEC. 803. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the administration
of chapter 403 of title 10, United States Code (relating to the United States
Military Academy), chapter 603 of such title (relating to the United States
Naval Academy), and chapter 903 of such title (relating to the United States
Air Force Academy), the Secretary of the military department concerned
shall take such action as may be necessary and appropriate to insure that
(1) female individuals shall be eligible for appointment and admission to the
service academy concerned beginning with appointments to such academy
for the class beginning in calendar year 1976, and (2) the academic and other
relevant standards required for appointment, admission, training, graduation,
and commissioning of female individuals shall be the same as those required
for male individuals, except for those minimum essential adjustments in such
standards required because of physiological differences between male and
female individuals.
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Corps policy.2O Furthermore, "[n]ational defense lies within the
federal not state sphere."' 1 The lack of state competence in
national defense matters limits the force of a national defense
justification for maintaining VMI as an all-male institution. 22 The
argument that men and women are dissimilarly situated with
respect to admissions because of combat exclusion laws may be
an example of deference to legislative pronouncements "be-
com[ing] facile abstractions used to justify a result."23
Additionally, claims that men and women are dissimilarly sit-
uated because women cannot perform as well as men at a military
school are fatuous. Women generally have performed very well
at the service academies and other military colleges.m With the
230. See Rostker v. Goldberg , 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981). Although the Army still officially
observes this policy, some analysts argue it does not comport with reality. See BRIAN
MITCHELL, WEAK LINK: THE FEMINIZATION OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY 119-20 (1989).
Additionally, Congress is in the process of debating changes in the combat exclusionary
laws in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. See S. 1515, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. S 12
(1991) (establishing a commission to study the assignment of women in the armed forces).
231. United States v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142, 153 (lst Cir.
1985).
232. Cadets at integrated military schools opine that an all-male environment does not
adequately prepare a cadet to serve in the sexually integrated armed services of today.
See Susan Dodge, Unlike VMI and Citadel, in the Corps of Cadets at North Georgia College,
Men and Women Learn and Train Side by Side, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 21, 1990,
at Al, A34:
Male cadets at North Georgia believe men who graduate from coeduca-
tional military programs are better prepared to work alongside women in
the Army. The Army admits women into all of its branches except the
infantry, armor, and special-forces units.
"A graduate of an all-male military school wouldn't necessarily know how
to deal with women in leadership roles, or women under his command," says
Eric Norris, a senior cadet. "It wouldn't be realistic."
The court noted that the United States Military Academy at West Point agreed with
this general proposition. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1428 (WiD. Va.
1991), appeal docketed, No. 90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991).
233. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70. Regardless of these arguments, courts may still invoke
deference to achieve some doctrinal consistency. If the current combat exclusion laws
are constitutional, a ruling against VMI may have a restrictive effect on military training
in the future. Hypothetically, if Congress determined that the percentage of women in
the military was too high and wished to restrict admission to the military academies to
men, a ruling against VMI would almost necessarily tie Congress' hands.
234. For example,
Cadet Staff Sgt. Shelly Beseman... is a member of the elite NGC [North
Georgia College] Ranger Challenge team. In a recent competition, Beseman
defeated all male competitors in every event, including a 6-kilometer race in
full field gear....
Cadet Command Sgt. Maj. Dawn Wood ...obtained the highest rank
possible as a North Georgia junior. She oversees about 280 cadets as the
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notable exception of courses in military science, women have
performed academically as well or better than their male coun-
terparts.P5 Moreover, sociological evidence indicates that a per-
son's ability to lead in military academies is not related to sex
except when the followers hold stereotypic attitudes toward sex
roles.P
ranking non-commissioned officer and is a strong candidate to become cadet
corps commander in her senior year.
Larry Fricks, North Gergia Praises Female Cadets as WM Citadel Fight, Gannett News
Serv., Apr. 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File. The significance of
these achievements by women cadets at North Georgia College (NGC) is indicated by the
fact that only 20 of the 490 North Georgia College cadets are female. Dodge, supra note
232, at Al, A34. West Point, the classes of which usually contain approximately 10%
females, selected its first female brigade commander in 1989. Frank Fisher, She's West
Point's First Female Top Cadet, L.A. TMES, Oct. 22, 1989, at A24. She is a member of
the tenth class at West Point to include women. Id.
Some of the seemingly disproportionate success of the women cadets results from the
fact that the schools expect the women to meet lower physical standards than the men.
For example, at NGC women are required to perform only 52 regular pushups in a 2-
minute period, whereas men must perform 82. Dodge, supra note 232, at A34. The
standards at VMI are set above the standards of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
because VMI believes their cadets "one, should be physically fit and two, be a cut above
those standards set by the services, in that they must lead by example" Letter from
Arnold W. Joyce, Professor of Physical Education, to William DeVan (Oct. 15, 1990) (on
file with the William and Mary Law Review) (discussing VMI physical fitness standards).
235. JEROME ADAMS, REPORT OF THE ADMISSION OF WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES
MILITARY ACADEMY: PROJECT ATHENA 1 91 (1979) (Project Athena was the United States
Military Academy's longitudinal study on integration). Over 40% of the women in West
Point's class of 1980 were in the bottom quarter of their class in upper level military
science classes. See id. Subsequent classes maintained this performance level. Id.
236. See Jerome Adams et al., Group Performance at West Point: Relationships with
Intelligence and Attitudes Toward Sex Roles, 7 ARMED FORCES & Soc'y 246, 253 (1981).
This study found a positive correlation between intelligence and leadership ability that
was enhanced by male leadership when the group held traditional attitudes towards
women. Id. If the group held egalitarian attitudes towards women, no significant difference
in the follower's perception of the leader's effectiveness existed. Id. Although the study
was based on subordinates with an average SAT score of above 1200, and "[cilearly, the
average intelligence level of subordinates in today's Army is much below that," id. at
254, it indicates that gender will not affect leadership effectiveness when attitudes are
properly adjusted within the ranks. Accord Robert Rice et al., Leader Sex, Leader Success,
and Leadership Process: Two Field Studies, 69 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 12, 27 (1984) (finding
that "[1eader sex seldom has shown strong and replicable effects in operational settings
where male and female cadets regularly train for their roles as military leaders:').
Furthermore, within the context of a military school, any differences between the
leadership abilities of men and women would be expected to change over time as the
men became accustomed to finding women at the school. See Dodge, supra note 232, at
Al, A34. Evidence at North Georgia Military School where "few students spend much
time thinking about the integration of the corps" supports this result. Id.; see also United
States v. Virginia Military Inst., 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1428 (W.D. Va. 1991), appeal docketed,
No. 96-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991). But see Adams, supra note 13:
The continuing relationship between physical measures and leadership rat-
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Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment, however, "require[s] a
State to pretend that demonstrable differences between men and
women do not . . .exist. ''2 7 No court would limit an equitable
remedy in the VMI litigation to the individual applicant in ques-
tion, so the court must examine whether the group itself, not
just an individual within the group, is similarly situated. The
most accurate inquiry into whether the differences between men
and women make them dissimilarly situated with respect to
admissions to a military college must focus on whether the
admission of women to the national service academies has had a
noticeable effect on the instructional programs at those acade-
mies.m Evidence of a significant and essentially uniform impact
on the educational systems at military colleges that admit women2
indicates the existence of some quality to coeducation in a mili-
tary environment that makes women dissimilarly situated.2 40
ings is ... demonstrated with counts of dropping out of the two-mile runs
(FALLOUT) during CBT [Cadet Basic Training]. The more a woman falls out
during CBT, the lower her leadership rating after CBT .... FALLOUT is
not related to leadership ratings taken for men. Very few men failed to
complete the two mile runs-the average was less than one-while women
dropped out more frequently.
Id. at 534; see also Marilyn Greene, Female Military Students Still Do Battle with Bias,
USA TODAY, May 24, 1990, at A2 (discussing discrimination and prejudice at the Naval
and Air Force Academics and at West Point); Lisa Liff, Sex Bias Study Takes Naval
Academy to Task, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1990, at B3 (discussing sexual harassment and
discrimination at the Naval Academy).
237. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 481 (1981) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
238. Although the inference that a military college will adopt the adjustments of the
academies automatically is not certain, several factors logically indicate that such a college
would adopt the academy approaches to some minimal extent. If a Court were to force
VMI to admit women, the probable remedy would involve an order "to formulate, adopt,
and fully and timely implement a plan to remedy fully their discriminatory policies and
practices:' See Complaint at 4, 2, United States v. Virginia, No. 90-0126-R (W.D. Va.
filed Mar. 1, 1990). Women at the service academies currently comprise 9-12% of the
class, and a study at VMI indicates that approximately 10% of the class would have to
be female in order to make necessary changes economically practical. The Regiment of
Women, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1990, at F2. Because studies of coeducation indicate that
the minority gender must make up approximately 10-40% of the class for integration to
be successful, VMI's selection of a 10% threshold does not indicate hostility toward
women. See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1437. These and other similarities between the
service academies and VMI compelled the court to state that "VMI would have to make
the changes analogous to those that have been made at the service academies." Id. at
1439.
239. See infra notes 241-79 and accompanying text.
240. Additionally, this quality relates to the issue of whether the admission of women
will actually diminish the State's educational diversity. See infra notes 280-90 and accom-
panying text.
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In three of the national service academies, the integration of
women has had a deleterious effect on both the unity of the
cadet class and the physical standards demanded of cadets.241 The
essential aspects of military training are the strong emphasis on
physical training and rigid command structures and the forging
of the individual trainees into a unified body.42 This unity is a
necessary element of battlefield successm and results from a
common and shared experience that transforms a civilian into a
soldier.44
The failure of integration was most notable at the Air Force
Academy where the attitudes of both the administration and stu-
dents were generally most favorable to integration.4 From the
very first week of Basic Cadet Training at the Academy, "doolies,"
or first year cadets, noted evidence of double standards in housing,2
241. See infra notes 245-79 and accompanying text. Very little literature exists con-
cerning integration at the Coast Guard Academy, and therefore this Note does not
address the results of its experience.
242. See STIEHM, supra note 10, at 87-146 (discussing training at the service academies).
Nonservice academy graduates develop this unification through basic training. See William
Arkin & Lynne R. Dobrofsky, Military Socialization and Masculinity, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES
151, 157-58 (1978).
243. John P. Lovell, Professionalism and the Service Academies, 19 Ai. BEHAVIORAL
SCIENTIST 605, 613 (1976) (discussing the importance of loyalty on the battlefield).
244. See MITCHELL, supra note 230, at 51-53. See generally, ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE
RITES OF PASSAGE 187-94 (Monika Vizedom & Gabrielle Caffee trans., 1960) (discussing
the ceremonial patterns used by various societies to mark the transition between stages
in an individual's life, which Van Gennep broadly defines as rites of separation, transition,
and incorporation).
245. See STIEHM, supra note 10, at 89-146.
246. See MITCHELL, supra note 230, at 57. In describing the effect of women on the
Academy, Mitchell stated,
Also inhibiting the assimilation of women was the mistake of concentrating
them on the sixth floor of Vandenberg Hall, instead of quartering them with
their assigned squadrons. During the school year, doolies put themselves in
harm's way anytime they entered their squadron area. They were often
rousted out of bed at an early hour by screaming upperclassmen, who dogged
them constantly during the five or ten minutes they had to prepare for the
morning run. After the run, they had to hurry again to shower and dress
before the breakfast formation. Harassment was a frequent interruption of
these meager moments of personal time. Just as frequently, doolies were
grabbed to form a detail to clean the day rooms, police the squadron area,
or turn in laundry. Other details in the evening took them away from their
studies.
The women, however, were spared such interruptions. Upperclassmen
could not roust the women out of bed and send them scurrying up and down
halls in their skivies, as they did the men. After a squadron run, the women
returned immediately to Vandenberg Hall, escaping further harassment as
well as the morning details. Out of sight and out of mind, they were usually
left alone in the evenings also. This arrangement produced the Academy's
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grooming,27 and physical conditioning;m as a result, "[ijnstead of
growing closer through shared experiences, male and female cadets
grew further apart." 9 This may have explained the increase in
male attrition from thirty-five percent to forty-four percent of the
entering class.2
The United States Naval Academy and the United States
Military Academy at West Point devised separate physical stan-
dards for men and women.2s1 The classic example is the fate of
the Enduro run, a timed two and one-half mile run in which a
cadet wore combat boots and a helmet while carrying a rucksack,
canteen, rifle, and poncho.2m In the first year of integration, West
Point required women to perform the run, but did not count the
women's results when awarding the Recondo patch.as Although
less than half as many women completed the run as men, virtually
the same percentage of women received the patch.2- Male cadets
were understandably outraged at the double standard, and the
Academy agreed to count the female results the following year.2ss
In the second year of integration, 82/o of the male cadets received
intended result of making life easier for the women, but it also produced
the unintended result of making their male classmates resent them more.
Absent from so much of daily squadron life and shielded from even mild
harassment, the women never earned membership in their assigned squad-
rons.
Id.,
247. Although 10 U.S.C. S 4342 (1988) required that the service academies make only
the "minimum essential adjustments ... required because of physiological differences
between male and female individuals," female cadets were not required to shave their
heads in the same way as male cadets. MITCHELL, supra note 230, at 53. Mitchell claims
head shaving is part of "the Rite of Separation" intended to separate the cadet from his
or her former life and prepare him or her for the future as a cadet and is thus an
essential part of the socialization process. Id- at 51-52.
248. Women performed 50% of the pushups men did, jumped only 80%/o as far, did
90% as many situps and performed flexed-arm hangs instead of pull-ups. STIEHM, supra
note 10, at 166, 168. Despite the lesser performance, women suffered significantly more
injuries than men. Id.
249. MITCHELL, supra note 230, at 56.
250. Id- at 66.
251. Id- at 71.
252. I&
253. Id. at 71. The Recondo patch is given to cadets if they can successfully complete
a short course in reconnaissance and commando training at West Point. Within the cadet
culture, aquiring the patch is significant as a "rite of passage" and as a symbol of "elitism"
within the Corps. Interview with Brig. Gen. John Bard (United States Army, Ret.),
Former Commandant of Cadets, United States Military Academy, from Jan. 1977 through
July 1979, in Williamsburg, Va. (Nov. 1, 1991).
254. Id, at 71-72.
255. Id.
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the Recondo patch, but only 32% of the women received the
patch.2
In the third year of integration, the Academy changed its
mind again, this time to spare the female cadets the stigma of
failure by eliminating the Enduro run from the training pro-
gram altogether, for both men and women. The final official
report on integration at West Point hailed this as a good
example of "the Academy's attempt to normalize physical re-
quirements."''
Additional examples of changes at the academies abound. The
Naval Academy formerly required all midshipmen to perform a
thirty-four foot jump into a pool of water before graduating.m
The jump simulates abandoning ship, but because females are
not allowed aboard ship, a female first-class midshipman may
refuse to do the jump and still graduate.29 Peer ratings, a means
of gauging leadership capability, were discontinued at West Point
after women consistently received lower ratings than men.26°
Except while on parade, West Point required women to carry M-
16 rifles while the men had to carry M-14s which weighed
approximately two and one-half pounds more than the M-16s.21
More recently, West Point eliminated its requirement that cadets
carry weapons during running exercises.2 2 Karate and self-de-
fense classes for females replaced boxing and wrestling courses
still required of male cadets at West Point and Annapolis.26
Whereas units formerly performed morning runs together, they
are now separated into ability groups; due to increased injuries
among women, participants now wear running shoes rather than
combat boots.2
256. Id. at 72.
257. Id. (quoting JEROME ADAMS, REPORT OF THE ADMISSION'OF WOMEN TO THE UNITED
STATES MILITARY ACADEMY: PROJECT ATHENA IV 48 (1980)).
258. Id. at 87.
259. Id.
260. See ADAMS, supra note 235, at 110-15; ALAN G. VITTERS & NORA SCOTT KINZER,
REPORT OF THE ADMISSION OF WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY: PROJECT
ATHENA I 114-20 (1977). Similar changes occurred at the Naval Academy. See MITCHELL,
supra note 230, at 75.
261. MITCHELL, supra note 230, at 70.
262. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1439 (W.D. Va. 1991), appeal docketed,
No. 90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991).
263. ALAN G. VITTERS, REPORT OF THE ADMISSION OF WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES
MILITARY ACADEMY: PROJECT ATHENA H 32 (1978). Currently, VMI requires all cadets to
take boxing and wrestling courses. CATALOGUE, supra. note 22, at 127.
264. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1439; ADAMS, supra note 235, at 55.
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Even where the academies have not initiated the changes, the
inevitable ambiguities of sexual relations have created a dynamic
of their own. The ambiguous line between hazing, used to create
unity among the cadets,265 and sexual harassment has affected
the ability of cadets to carry out punishments in the traditional
manner. In one instance, a Naval Academy upperclassman forced
a female cadet to eat with an oversized spoon as a punishment
for poor table manners.2 66 The cadet complained of sexual ha-
rassment, and the Academy administration punished the upper-
classman. 267 In a more recent example, male colleagues chained
a female Naval Academy cadet to a urinal.268 This sort of hazing
is common among the men at the Academy; but, because it
involved a woman, it was publicized and condemned as an ex-
ample of sexual harassment. The Naval Academy warned the
cadets responsible for the incident that future incidents would
result in expulsion. 269 Additionally, male cadets have experienced
difficulty in disciplining female cadets simply because they feel
less comfortable meting out punishments to females than they
do to males.20
Although some may question the importance of physical prow-
ess, it remains an essential element of masculine culture and
military training2 1 When integrating a military school, the great-
est difficulty is distinguishing between "what is male and what
is military."' 2 Granted, a reexamination of qualities tested may
correct some of the differences in requirements,23 but efforts to
265. The author does not endorse hazing to create class unity, but offers this as an
example of how the admission of women to the academies precipitated change.
266. MITCHELL, supra note 230, at 75-76.
267. Id. at 76.
268. Hughes, supra note 33, at 13.
269. Id.
270. See VITTERS & KINZER, SUpra note 260, at 79; STEIHM, supra note 10, at 241. Male
cadets planning a military career should gain from overcoming this discomfort while
attending college. Because VMI is not a military school in the same sense as the academies,
this argument would not appear to work .in DOJ's favor.
271. See Adams, supra note 13, at 535:
In summary, these results paint a picture of leadership ratings at West Point
that is related to what is stereotypically masculine: physical prowess, positive
attitude about physical activity, and a masculine self-image. In a traditionally
male-oriented subsystem, leadership ratings for members of the Class of
1980 seem to be related to masculinity, both for men and women cadets.
272. STIEHM, supra note 10, at 5.
273. See Janice P. Yoder, Another Look at Women in the United States Army: A Comment
on Woefel's Article, 9 SEx ROLEs 285, 288 (1983). At West Point, an obstacle course
contained an eight-foot wall optimally navigated by men weighing 145 pounds and standing
5 feet 10 inches tall. Id. at 287. To compensate for the superior upper body strength of
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maintain the female component274 have changed the manner of
education at the academies. Furthermore, the presence of women
has changed institutional social dynamics25 and classroom ambi-
male cadets, a two-foot step was constructed on the wall when women were admitted.
Cadets of either sex could use the step and incur an identical time penalty. Id. When a
female cadet approached the wall, grasped the top and walked her way up the wall
rather than pulling herself up using her arms, an observing officer chastised her for
using her legs instead of her arms. Id. "No one considers that inexperience can be
remedied or that physiological differences may simply require a reexamination of exphasis
[sic] (as in the wall example, the use of powerful legs). Instead, the solutions proposed
are directed at changing or accommodating individuals." Id. But cf. United States v.
Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1439 (W.D. Va. 1991) (noting that since the admission of
women to West Point, the obstacle course has been revised to remove certain events
requiring upper body strength, due in part to concern that "women would be psycholog-
ically discouraged by them"), appeal docketed, No. 90-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991). As
the law requiring admission of female cadets to the military academies allowed only for
changes necessary to accomodate physiological differences, the reason behind these
changes indicates a strong effort by the military to maintain the female component. See
supra note 229 (quoting 10 U.S.C. S 4342 (1988)).
274. Traditionally, the Air Force Academy allowed a male doolie who wished to leave
to do so on the assumption that quitting revealed a character flaw. MITCHELL, supra note
230, at 60. After integration, the Academy continued this policy for male cadets, but
required female cadets to attend mandatory counselling before leaving. Id. "Such excep-
tions made men of the Class of 1980 feel that the Academy considered it more important
for a woman to graduate than for a man." Id. at 60-61.
275. An interview with Brig. Gen. (Ret.) John Bard, former Commandant of Cadets at
West Point, revealed:
The phenomenon which came from women in the military is that men and
women act differently around each other. The Army was familiar with
behavior in an all-male environment, but a lot changes when women are
introduced into that environment. Behavior changes, and while that is neither
right nor wrong, it does have both advantages and disadvantages.
It is not easy to get back to business as usual when you integrate by fiat.
The military has been characterized by an aggressive, highly physical, male
culture and there arises a hostility toward women. On the other extreme,
you have to control the sexuality aspect and the paternalism which also
arises in the male-female relationship. The command structure has to clamp
down on both extremes.
Women are just as capable of performing military tasks and providing
leadership as men are. The Army has determined that an extremely small
percentage of the work cannot normally be done by women because they
don't on the average have the upper body and abdominal strength that most
men have.
Telephone Interview with Brig. Gen. John Bard (United States Army, Ret.), Former
Commandant of Cadets, United States Military Academy, from Jan. 1977 through July
1979 (Feb. 28, 1991).
This change in social dynamics is not limited to military colleges. When the last all-
female class graduated from Wheaton College in Norton, Massachusetts, in May, 1990,
"[s]ome of the graduating women departed saying that they felt the cherished culture of
an all-female institution had been soured" by the presence of men in the festivities.
Hughes, supra, note 33, at 13.
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ence. m6 As the Court noted of a different forum in Taylor v.
Louisiana,27
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community
made up exclusively of one is different from a community com-
posed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other
is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from
either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet
a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.27
As the experience of the academies shows, a distinct quality also
may be lost if both sexes are included. 9 Thus, for purposes of
military education, the sexes are not similarly situated.
The Existence of Important Government Interests
The Commonwealth of Virginia claimed an "important interest
in preserving the diversity of the [state higher education] system
and a balance in the educational choices offered." One cannot
doubt the importance of the state's interest in education. The
Court has declared that "education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments."'' 1 The Virginia Code
contains a statement of policy "that this and future generations
of youth be given the fullest opportunity to learn and to develop
their intellectual and mental capacities" through institutions of
higher education.2 The vast sums of money the state annually
budgets for higher education substantiate this statement of pol-
icy.2 Additionally, the Commonwealth seeks to ensure that it
provides education in a diversified manner by coordinating changes
276. Many women who attend the academies do not recognize the change because they
have nothing with which to compare their experience. STIEHM, supra note 10, at 242 n.c.
At least one male cadet at the Air Force Academy noted that the free-wheeling discussions
that dominated the classroom prior to integration became much more reserved after
integration. Id. at 242.
277. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (invalidating law with different procedures for placing men
and women with a jury pool).
278. Id. at 531-32 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)) (emphasis
added).
279. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
280. Complaint at 4, Virginia Military Inst. v. Thornburgh, No. 90-0083 (W.D. Va. filed
Feb. 5, 1990).
281. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953).
282. VA. CODE ANN. S 23-30.39 (Michie 1985).
283. See 1990 Va. Acts 2020 (listing total state budget allocations of $10,787,438,207 for
higher education in Virginia over the 1990-92 biennium).
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in programs through the state Council of Higher Education.M
One would expect the typical freshman entering the Virginia
system of higher education to be only eighteen years of age. This
is below both Virginia's legal drinking ageP 5 and the common
law age of majority.2 "[T]he special emotional problems of the
adolescent years are matters of human experience," and eighteen-
year-olds are not far removed from this category.27 A single-sex
learning institution can "free its students of the burden of playing
the mating game while attending classes, thus giving academic
rather than sexual emphasis."' Furthermore, common human
experience indicates that viable, effective education demands
accommodation of individual differences. As Justice Powell stated,
"A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect
for diversity." These considerations lead to the inevitable con-
clusion that the state's interest in diversity of education is a
fundamental element of its important interest in education in
general. One commentator has characterized the alternative as
the "interstate highway approach . . . to higher education for a
mall-oriented culture."'
Virginia's state support for one of the two single-sex, military
colleges in the country enhances the diversity of educational
opportunity for men. This, however, does not mean that VMI's
284. See supra note 61.
285. See VA. CODE ANN. S 4-62 (Michie 1988) (restricting consumption of alcohol to those
over 21 years).
286. At common law, "a minor, male or female, [did] not attain majority until the age
of twenty-one." Koonin v. Hornsby, 140 A.2d 309, 311 (D.C. 1958); cf. Hurdle v. Prinz, 235
S.E.2d 354, 355-56 (Va. 1977) (discussing the fact that the state legislature lowered the
common law age of majority of 21 years by enacting a statute that specified 18 years).
287. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 887 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam by
an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
288. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 739 n.5 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief for Mississippi Univ. for Women Alumnae Ass'n
at 2-3 (No. 81-406)). The experience at the military academies has proven clearly erroneous
any argument that the discipline at a military school will counteract the natural tendency
for students to date. See, e.g., Air Force: Close Encounters, TIME, Oct. 29, 1990, at 47
(reporting an incident in which a male cadet had six male friends observe from his closet
while he had sex with his girlfriend, a female cadet); see also MrrCHELL, supra note 230,
at 77 (stating that 20 of the first 25 women to drop out of the Naval Academy's class of
1980 married former midshipmen); Adams, supra note 236, at 537 (discussing survey
showing that 86.0% of women and 50.3% of men at West Point approve of dating
relationships between cadets in the same class and company, 98.5% of women and 57.9%
of men approved of dating between cadets in same class and different company, and
38.0% of women and 16.5% of men approved of dating between plebes and upperclassmen).
289. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting).
290. Jere Real, The Last of the Old Corps; Federal Suits Against Virginia Military
Institute for Refusing to Admit Women, NAT'L REV., Aug. 6, 1990, at 23.
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policy furthers educational choice for all youth; the all-male
admissions policy decreases options available to women. Both
Vorchheimer v. School District'1 and Williams v. McNair im-
plicitly approved the concept of "separate but equal" for gender
discrimination in education because it enhanced educational choices
that may not otherwise have been available to the benefitted
classes.23 In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 4 the
Court did not overturn the reasoning of those decisions.295 Vir-
ginia does operate a substantially equivalent coeducational cadet
style program at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Uni-
versity, but no public all-female school exists in Virginia. Al-
though courts strictly interpreted "separate but equal," due to
the nature of military education and the general decline in the
number of women's schools in the country today,27 one should
not fault Virginia for failing to supply an all-female public college
within the "separate but equal" framework. 8
The better view of "separate but equal" in the sphere of
education is one that looks at the elements of diversity that VMI
provides to the state system and balances those elements against
the effects of diversity on the disadvantaged class.m The benefit
of this view is that it takes into account the realities of the
educational marketplace, the needs of the benefitted class, and
harm to the disadvantaged class. Allowing VMI to remain an all-
male institution furthers the interests of the approximately 380
young men who opt for single-sex education at VMI each year. 00
Many of these men might not be able to afford single-sex edu-
cation in a private school; and, should a court force VMI to admit
women, the likely result would be that no man would be able to
291. 532 F.2d 880, 888.
292. 316 F. Supp 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
293. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
294. 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 (1982).
295. But see supra note 189.
296. See, e.g., McLauren v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
297. See supra note 34.
298. These considerations are supported further by the shackles that the Educational
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. S 1681 (1988), place on Virginia in regards to establishing
a "separate but equal" institution for women. Virginia could conceivably charter an all-
female military school and still fall within the exceptions under S 1681(a)(4), but such an
institution would probably not be economically viable.
299. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 735, 742 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
300. See CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 144.
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obtain a single-sex military education within the United States.30 1
On the other side of the balance are the interests of the class
of women who wish to attend VMI but are presumptively barred
from admission. These women may still attend a school that
would provide them with a military education.3 °2 VMI denies
them only the right to attend a specific schoolV3 The Court has
never recognized such a right.304 Thus, if one balances the en-
hancement of diversity for the benefitted male class achieved by
maintaining VMI as a single-sex institution against the decrease
in choice for the burdened female class, the clear result is that
the state's interest in diversity is consistent with the Vorchheimer
"separate but equal" reasoning. °5
The differences between men and women may find their most
compelling manifestation in the context of military education. A
reversal of Judge Kiser's ruling, however, would have repercus-
sions in all spheres of the educational world. As problems asso-
ciated with rising numbers of single-parent families confront
public school systems across the country, these systems are
experimenting with a return to single-sex classrooms3 °6 A ruling
against VMI would have a chilling effect on experimentation with
such educational methodologies.
301. If a court were to force VMI to integrate, The Citadel in Charleston, South
Carolina, would probably face a similar order, so no all-male publicly funded colleges
would remain in the country. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Furthermore,
single-sex military education tends to be different from integrated military education.
See supra notes 241-79 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 68, 232 and accompanying text.
303. This is in essence a "catch-22" in operation. VMI is unique because of its all-male
character. The all-male admissions policy therefore denies women the opportunity to
enjoy a unique educational experience provided by the state. If women are allowed into
the Institute, the factors making VMI unique would vanish. Women would thus be denied
the unique educational opportunities currently afforded by VMI as a result of their very
admission. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (W.D. Va. 1991), appeal
docketed, No. 96-0126-R (4th Cir. filed Aug. 12, 1991).
304. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 736 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
305. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), affd per curiam by
an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
306. Most of these experiments are directed at black youths. See, e.g., Kenneth J.
Cooper, Three Rs and Role Model in Baltimore Third Grade: Single-Sex Class Harnesses
Boys' Instincts, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1990, at Al (discussing a pilot program of an all-boys
third grade class); Joseph Berger, New York Board Backs School for Minority Men, N.Y.
TBsns, Jan. 10, 1991, at Al (discussing plans to open a high school directed at black males
in New York, New York, and a similar plan to open elementary and middle schools for
black and hispanic boys in Milwaukee, Wisconsin).
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Is There a "Substantial Relationship?"
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,30 MUW claimed
the presence of men in the classroom would eliminate the special
educational benefits women received in a single-sex environ-
ment.38 The Court found that this argument was "fatally under-
mine[d]" by "MUW's policy of permitting men to attend classes
as auditors." Additionally, "[t]he uncontroverted record re-
vealfed] that admitting men to nursing classes does not affect
teaching style, . . . would not affect the performance of the
female nursing students, . . . and that men in coeducational
nursing schools do not dominate the classroom."3' 1 Although
women may attend night classes and summer school at VMI,
they may not visit cadet classes or the VMI barracks.31' The
evidence from the academies indicates that the presence of women
would affect esprit de corps and nonacademic standards.3 2 Thus,
both of the factual elements that the Court used in Hogan to
demonstrate the lack of "a substantial relationship" between
MUW's female-only admissions policy and the policy's stated ends
do not apply to VMI.
Because of basic physiological differences, the district court
found that VMI would not allow the corps to subject female
cadets to the same hazing and humiliating treatment that shapes
a VMI cadet. 13 The nearly uniform experiences of the national
service academies are strong evidence that VMI will find it
impossible to retain its present system if a court forces VMI to
admit women. 3 4 Only by excluding women can VMI retain its
unique educational system.
307. 458 U.S. 718.
308. See id. at 721.
309. Id. at 730.
310. Id. at 731 (citations omitted).
311. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1425 (WD. Va. 1991), appeal docketed,
No. 96-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991).
312. See supra notes 241-79 and accompanying text.
313. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1413. One of the unofficial activities that takes place is
a shower run. Interview with William Cronenberg, 1st Lt. U.S.A.R., VMI Class of 1988,
in Williamsburg, Va. (Dec. 5, 1990). All rats are stripped naked and run through the
communal shower with some shower heads turned on all hot and others all cold. Id.
Although the substantive benefits of this treatment are at best questionable, it does
provide the kind of common shared experience that binds together each class of cadets.
In a coeducational setting, such activity would probably be considered beyond the limits
of sexual privacy that our society still recognizes between the sexes in the form of
separate bathrooms. See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1438.
314. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1438-41.
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Does the Discrimination Perpetuate a Stereotype?
The traditional test for perpetuation of stereotypes looked to
determine whether the classification was based on "old notions"3 15
about the "proper place" of the sexes.3 16 In Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan,3 17 the Court noted that "[b]y assuring that
Mississippi allots more openings in its state-supported nursing
schools to women than it does to men, MUW's admissions policy
lends credibility to the old view that women, not men, should
become nurses."318 As noted above, this approach suffers from
two major flaws.1 9 As society changes, so do views as to what
constitutes a stereotype 2 Constitutional decisionmaking based
upon these changing values is bound to reach inconsistent results
over time.321 Similarly, the biases of the fact finder will certainly
play a role in determining whether some classification is a re-
flection of a stereotype or a real difference between the classes.
The Court based its decision in Hogan on the perpetuation of
a professional stereotype. One can divide the question of whether
VMI perpetuates an impermissible stereotype into three separate
queries. Is VMI a professional school? If so, does an all-male
admissions policy perpetuate the "myth" that only men are fit
to practice that profession; and if not, does the policy perpetuate
some other stereotype?323
Statistics contradict the notion that VMI is a "professional
school." Although VMI is a military school, it is not a professional
military school.3 2 Unlike national academy cadets, the military
315. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 14 (1975).
316. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
317. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
318. Id. at 729-30.
319. See supra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
321. A brief comparison of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), or Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), discloses the fluid nature of broad inquiries based on societal
beliefs about the proper roles of the races or sexes.
322. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729.
323. Throughout his opinion, Judge Kiser declared that his findings of fact were based
on real differences and not stereotypes. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp.
1407, 1432, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 96-0126-R (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991).
Merely stating that factual findings are not based on stereotypes will not prove such a
contention; however, the documentation of these differences from sources outside the
opinion supports Judge Kiser's contention that his findings of fact were not mere
reiterations of pernicious stereotypes. Id.
324. See id. at 1427, 1432.
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does not automatically offer commissions to VMI graduates.3
The school does not require cadets to accept military commissions
if offered, and only seventy percent of VMI men accept commis-
sions.3 26 Only eighteen percent of VMI graduates make a career
out of the military3 27 Even if one considers VMI a professional
military school and that status perpetuates a stereotype of men
as warriors, it does nothing more than reflect the reality that
only men are eligible for combat3 28
The existence of VMI as an all-male institution may perpetuate
other stereotypes, such as the idea that women cannot success-
fully compete in a military environment. The existence of alter-
native programs for women does not effectively dispel this
stereotype, because the existence of VMI as an institution holding
on to the stereotype allows the stereotype to flourish with the
support of the state. That the presence of women has changed
the way the academies conduct education 329 does not imply that
women cannot compete in a military environment, nor does it
necessarily mean that the educational experience overall is im-
paired. It only means that the environment that some male
students seek in an all-male institution has not been successfully
replicated in a coeducational setting. Until evidence to the con-
trary emerges, the stereotype is really one of fact that does not
merit intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment under current
analytical standards.
The true issue of stereotype is unrelated to professional and
educational issues. So long as men feel women are somehow
different and women continue to feel the same way about men,
both groups will desire to maintain some institutions that are
exclusively theirs. Eliminating public support for these institu-
tions would reduce the diversity that has always been the hall-
mark and strength of our society.
RESOLUTION, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS HARMS, AND REMEDIES
AT LAW
The previous analysis, as well as the court's somewhat sparser
analysis, is dissatisfying because it holds forth the possibility
325. CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 12.
326. VMI Drops Commission Acceptance Requirement, supra note 228.
327. CATALOGUE, supra note 22, at 7. Within six years of graduation from West Point,
75% of the men and 60/0 of the women from the Class of 1980 remained in the Army.
MITCHELL, supra note 230, at 84.
328. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 241-79 and accompanying text.
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that the Constitution permits and should continue to permit
sexual discrimination without a remedy. It does so because men
and women are not androgynous. In essence, society can choose
either to tolerate discrimination for "important governmental
reasons" or to eliminate the diversity that enriches the lives of
its people. Society, however, can avoid the limits presented by
this option if it is willing to make a closer distinction between
the kinds of cases reaching the courts, and if it is willing to
expand the remedies available for victims of sexual discrimina-
tion.
The doctrinal development culminating in Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogane ° evolved from Stanton v. Stantonp and
Craig v. Boren.w The laws challenged in both of those cases
involved overt sexual discrimination.m In almost every other
case, the member of the disadvantaged class suffered a procedural
disabflity.3 Although the substantive harm to a female applicant
to VMI is denial of the educational opportunities offered by VMI,
her legal harm is a procedural bar.3es Both the state and those
young men who choose to attend VMI have a valid interest in
preserving the unique all-male structure of VMI, and admitting
women would defeat this purpose. 6
To provide a more predictable approach, the courts should
begin by distinguishing between those cases for which the state
action provides some procedure to evaluate the rights of the
parties and those for which it does not. Such an approach would
achieve many of the same results as the current doctrine. More-
over, this approach would provide a means for determining the
330. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
331. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
332. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
333. Craig, 429 U.S. at 192; Stanton, 421 U.S. at 8.
334. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720-21 (discussing admissions procedure in which male
applications to nursing school were not considered); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
381-82 (1979) (discussing law providing mothers, but not fathers, of illegitimate children
the absolute right to block adoptions by another member of same sex); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 270-71 (1979) (discussing law under which husbands, but not wives, could be
required to pay alimony); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524-25 (1975) (discussing
different procedures used to place men and women within a jury pool); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973) (discussing different procedures through which
military men and women could procure extra benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73
(1971) (discussing law that created statutory preference for men in same entitlement class
as women).
335. Students have no right to go to a specific state college. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 736
(Powell, J., dissenting).
336. See supra note 303.
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constitutionality of state action without the dangers of prejudice
inherent in determining whether a state's interests are important
enough to warrant discrimination, whether the means are sub-
stantially related to that end, and whether the law perpetuates
an impermissible stereotype.
If the state facially discriminates against one sex without
providing a modicum of due process, a court should hold the
action to the strict scrutiny standard. Application of strict scru-
tiny would surely achieve the same results that the Supreme
Court achieved in Stantons7 and Craig.ss If the law allows for
some procedural mechanism whereby a plaintiff can establish her
rights on an equal footing with men, she presumptively suffers
no gender discrimination. 9
If a procedural disability does exist, the court should decide
whether the state action implicates a group or individual right.
An individual right is one that affects the status of the individual
vis-a-vis another specific individual or the state-as-a-stateMO These
are the kinds of harms discussed in Reed v. Reed31 and Frontiero
v. Richardson.32 A group right is one that establishes the plain-
tiffs right vis-a-vis a group. If the state action implicates an
individual right, the procedural disability is per se unconstitu-
tional because the procedure would presumably take into account
the rights and interests of all the parties without having to resort
to the procedural disability. In the case of a group right, however,
the state finds itself in the position of providing special benefits
for one subset of individuals within a single gender group and
presumptively denying those benefits to all members of the
opposite gender group. If a procedural bar exists, the court should
balance the benefits to the advantaged class against the harms
to the disadvantaged class.
337. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
338. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
339. This analysis uses the example of a female plaintiff because females are the most
frequent victims of gender discrimination. The analysis also assumes that the procedural
elements would be sufficient to pass constitutional muster and would not be applied on
a covertly discriminatory basis.
340. By the term "state-as-a-state," this Note contemplates a situation in which the
state and the plaintiff are engaged in competition for some discrete and identifiable
benefit much in the same way that two private parties may compete. This Note uses the
term to avoid the vagaries of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence concerning whether
an actor qualifies as a state actor. At issue in any competition between a plaintiff and
the state-as-a-state would be rights that the court could allocate while only incidentally,
if at all, affecting the rights of groups operating under the state's auspices.
341. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
342. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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In performing this balancing test, the court should recognize
that some factors in the balancing test are "imponderables" ' 3
and "distinct qualities."" These flavors and qualities consist of
the varied effects that one sex has on the other. Neither the
state nor anyone else can truly quantify these effects, and re-
searchers are still discovering how extensively they permeate
our lives.4 5 Nonetheless, these effects represent a value, albeit
at times personal, that the law cannot ignore without completely
removing itself from human experience.
If the balancing test still favors discrimination, the state should
pay compensation to those victims of discrimination who actually
suffer its ill-effects because of procedural barriers. The Court
has acknowledged previously that even under strict scrutiny the
government may discriminate if it will save moneyM 6 and a
nonequitable remedy will require the state to "put its money
where its mouth is."47
The advantages of the proposed test are manifold. The test
mandates procedural processes to allocate rights among indivi-
duals and between the state-as-a-state. The balancing test rec-
ognizes that the state may sponsor certain group rights only at
343. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1975).
344. I&
345. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing research on gender-based
differences).
346. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689.
347. This approach deviates from current doctrine in two major ways. First, requiring
the state to pay compensation for a harm inflicted without violating the law contradicts
the general principle that a wrong should precede liability. The approach, however,
comports with the general theory of enterprise liability used in respondeat superior
cases. Although an employer may do nothing wrong, he is still held liable on the theory
that the harm would not have occurred "but for" the activities of the enterprise. See
WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 69 (1971). Whatever harm one suffers by being excluded
from a governmental benefit because of one's gender would not occur "but for" the
governmental program.
A second way in which this proposal deviates from the current doctrine is that it
proposes abandoning the use of equitable remedies to stamp out inequality. The fact that
state governments dominated by whites were willing to pay the price of a segregated
school system is testament to the notion that individuals who discriminate are not
influenced by economic rationality. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
354-55 (1981) (discussing the inefficiency of segregation). Such a comparison, however,
misses the point behind this approach. When the benefits of discrimination appear to
justify the means of discrimination, assurances that the judicial branch accurately weighed
the values can be most effectively verified by ensuring that the elected branches bear
the political costs of monetary compensation for the victims of that discrimination.
Further, a move to compensatory rather than equitable remedies is already afoot when
the violation is statutory. For example, Congress has acted to provide for compensatory
and punitive damages for intentional employment discrimination based on gender. See
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 5 102, 137 CONG. REC. D1490 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991).
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the expense of the rights and legitimate interests of those people
whom it excludes. By forcing the state to pay compensation to
victims of procedural gender discrimination, the victims of dis-
crimination receive redress without sacrificing the legitimate
rights and interests of the benefitted class.
Courts could easily devise standards for recovery on a case-
by-case basis. As a prerequisite, the state would have to surren-
der its claims to sovereign immunity. In the VMI case, applicants
could recover only if they complete a military education at a
comparable military college elsewhere.4 8 They would also have
to substantiate their true desire to attend VMI. Compensation
would amount to the increased cost of obtaining an education at
one of these other schools, provable psychological damage caused
by the discrimination, and perhaps some nominal amount for
stigmatic harm. The state should also pay lawyer's fees and costs.
The most difficult aspect of applying this test would be deter-
mining whether a group right is at stake. To qualify as a group
for purposes of applying the test, more than one individual would
have to experience the effects of the plaintiff's attempt to exer-
cise a claimed right. The group would have to be uniform in
gender and in some way insulated from general society.3 49 Addi-
tionally, the group could not qualify as a state actor, although it
may be able to operate under state auspices. We must be careful
to distinguish between the state actor and the object of its
actions. VMI as an institution is an actor. The student body is
the object of its actions, and the state may discriminate only
with respect to the composition of the student body. The most
obvious examples of groups that would meet these criteria are
athletes in a locker room, students in class, and certain social
organizations such as fraternities and sororities.
CONCLUSION
The VMI case illustrates a growing trend toward the belief
that discrimination on the basis of gender is per se both immoral
and unconstitutional. Although the long history of discrimination
348. Examples of such colleges would include the federal military academies and the
cadet corps at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and North Georgia
Military College.
349. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (stating
that disproportionate burdens may justify sex-based classifications in limited circum-
stances). This test would affirm the unconstitutionality of MUW's actions in Hogan because
admitting male students to the classroom would end the isolation of the female student
body from general society.
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in this country has resulted in the denial of fundamental and
important rights, the courts must be wary of throwing out the
baby with the bathwater. American society owes much to its
diversity, and maintaining single-sex education as an option fur-
thers that diversity. Many individuals cannot afford to attend a
private, single-sex college; by requiring VMI, The Citadel, and
all other public institutions to open their doors to both genders,
we eliminate freedom of choice for those less wealthy individuals
who cannot afford a private education.
The basic premise of this Note is that the sexes are not
fungible. This does not imply that one sex is superior to the
other, but only that the broad spectrum of interactions between
men and women creates a fundamentally different social dynamic
than those interactions between either just men or just women.
The sexual attractions and physical and emotional differences
between the sexes distinguish gender discrimination from racial
discrimination. Society must be sensitive to the fact that sex is
an inaccurate proxy and can do this by eliminating procedural
biases and broad laws that fail to grant members of one sex the
same rights and privileges as those of the other sex. This does
not mean, however, that society must disregard the costs of
integration to well-defined single-sex groups. Courts can balance
the costs of integration against the harm to the burdened indi-
viduals and compensate the individuals in ways that preserve
their integrity and the interests of the single-sex group. If society
insists on removing all forms of discrimination with equitable
remedies, its reflexive disdain for discrimination will stifle those
energies that maximize freedom and happiness for all.
A closer examination of the methods of state-supported dis-
crimination and its costs and benefits can make the law more
predictable and sensitive to everyone's needs. The courts can
and should dispense with elastic terms like "stereotypes," "im-
portant governmental interests," and "substantial relationships"
in favor of replicable analytical tools.
The issues surrounding gender discrimination under the Four-
teenth Amendment reflect the tension between demands for
equality and the reality of gender differences. The courts cannot
mandate equality when these differences are material, but indi-
viduals should not be denied equal opportunities to prove their
worth without compensation. The courts should not "erectO con-
formity into the noblest of virtues" and force the diversity that
350. See In Brief, the Law, supra note 1, at 60.
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enriches our society from its midst. As a society, we can and
should resolve these competing values by awarding common law
damages to victims of procedural gender discrimination. An award
of common law damages will compensate victims of procedural
gender discrimination and will shift the burden of such discrim-
ination onto the bodies that perpetrate the offending practices.
Thus, although plaintiffs may not receive the equitable remedy
they desire, they will receive a remedy to which they otherwise
would not be entitled, and our society will benefit by maintaining
diverse institutions capable of meeting the needs of the indivi-
duals they serve.
William A. DeVan
